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I. Introduction 
On his way home from the hospital with his newborn son, a 
hit-and-run accident left Jeremy Lew with a severely injured 
spine.1 Lew underwent surgery, during which his doctor implanted 
a device approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
between his cervical vertebrae.2 The treatment initially appeared 
successful, but Lew later began suffering from “unrelenting” pain, 
barely able to pick up his children.3 Although the FDA approved 
the device, the agency intended it for use only in the mid-to-lower 
spinal column.4 The off-label use of the medical device caused Lew 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Brian Krans, The Debate Over “Off-Label” Drug Use, HUFFINGTON 
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-debate-over-off-label-drug-
use_us_588bce2ee4b0cd25e49048b2 (last updated Jan. 30, 2017) (last visited Feb. 
18, 2018) (discussing the Lew accident and subsequent treatment) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 2. See Jim Spencer, Patients Who Received Medtronic’s Infuse Product to 
Get $8.45 Million in Settlements, STARTRIBUNE (Aug. 2, 2016, 8:25 PM), 
http://www.startribune.com/patients-who-received-medtronic-product-to-get-8-
45-million-in-settlements/388947831/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (reporting that 
Lew’s doctor implanted the “cage device” to hold a synthetic bone growth product 
in place) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. Krans, supra note 1; see also Spencer, supra note 2 (“Lew ended up with 
unwanted bone growth in [his spine] that caused nerve damage.”).  
 4. See Spencer, supra note 2 (“Lew’s spine surgery involved placement of 
Infuse in his neck, where the FDA had warned it could cause nerve and breathing 
problems.”). 
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unimaginable pain as a result of his nerve injury, and could have 
further caused sterility, infection, or urinary problems.5 
Nonetheless, the practice of using medications and medical devices 
for unapproved treatments continues.6 
Advocates of off-label medication use tout highly successful 
treatments that have saved lives even when approved treatments 
have failed.7 For example, after doctors diagnosed Lisa Rosendahl 
with a glioblastoma—a highly lethal brain tumor—they estimated 
that she would live for only another twelve months.8 Rosendahl’s 
doctor suggested she try chloroquine, a drug indicated for treating 
malaria and never before used for this type of illness, on the theory 
that the drug would make the tumor more vulnerable to existing 
treatments.9 Ultimately, chloroquine—in conjunction with the 
continued use of existing treatments—stabilized the tumor, and 
this use of the drug has since seen similar results in two other 
patients.10 This type of last-ditch effort understandably occurs in 
the treatment of otherwise fatal conditions, but off-label 
medication use commonly helps patients with less threatening 
illnesses as well.11 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Sheila Kaplan, Whistleblower Case Contends Surgical Device Maker 
Misled FDA—and Patients Paid the Price, STAT (Aug. 15, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/08/15/medtronic-medical-device-surgery-fda/ 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (listing injuries reported by more than 6,000 people 
who have sued Medtronics over the faulty device) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See infra Part III (discussing the current use of medications for off-label 
purposes). 
 7. See Dana Dovey, Glioblastoma Treatment Breakthrough: ‘Untreatable’ 
Brain Cancer Tumor Stabilized with Malaria Drug, MED. DAILY (Jan. 17, 2017, 
1:44 PM), http://www.medicaldaily.com/glioblastoma-treatment-breakthrough-
untreatable-brain-cancer-tumor-stabilized-408668 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) 
(detailing the successful off-label use of a malaria drug for the treatment of a 
brain tumor) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See id. (explaining that glioblastomas are notoriously difficult to treat). 
 9. See id. (noting that doctors thought chloroquine might disable the 
tumor’s defenses). 
 10. See id. (boasting clinical benefits in all three patients). 
 11. See, e.g., Lawrence T. Park et al., Evaluation and Treatment of Poor 
Sleep, 9 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 224, 226 (2007) 
(pointing to Tylenol PM and Nyquil for their off-label treatment of insomnia). For 
another example sure to arouse your interest, see James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, 
Off-label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liability for Unapproved 
Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 298 (2003) (discussing 
how Viagra originally received approval as a treatment for chest pain before 
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Typically, the FDA weighs a medication’s benefits against 
potentially harmful side effects as part of its New Drug Application 
(NDA) process, established by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA).12 Reserving enforcement of off-label medication 
promotion to the expertise of the FDA, however, has proved 
somewhat unsuccessful.13 Because FDA enforcement creates a 
chilling effect on manufacturers’ advertising, pharmaceutical 
companies have successfully challenged agency enforcement 
actions as violations of their First Amendment rights.14 After 
facing several challenges to its regulations, the FDA reduced the 
severity of its sanctions in an effort to avoid future lawsuits, but 
recent lower-court decisions have reinforced the notion that the 
FDA lacks a sufficient governmental interest to regulate this form 
of commercial speech.15  
As an alternative, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act16 allows 
private companies to sue their competitors for false or misleading 
advertising.17 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in POM 
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,18 however, has cast some doubt 
on pharmaceutical companies’ ability to challenge the promotion 
of products approved by the FDA.19 Although the Court held that 
                                                                                                     
doctors began prescribing it for the then off-label treatment of erectile 
dysfunction). 
 12. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(1938). See Leonard V. Sacks et al., Scientific and Regulatory Reasons for Delay 
and Denial of FDA Approval of Initial Applications for New Drugs 2000–2012, 
311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 378, 379 (2014) (explaining that manufacturers must 
provide evidence of a drug’s safety and efficacy before the FDA will approve it). 
 13. See infra Part III.A (discussing First-Amendment challenges to the 
FDA’s regulation of off-label drug promotion). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“Caronia argues that he was convicted for his speech—for promoting an 
FDA-approved drug for off-label use—in violation of his right of free speech under 
the First Amendment. We agree.”). 
 15. See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that the FDA narrowed its interpretation of the 
FDCA while Caronia was on appeal). 
 16. United States Trademark Act (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 
427 (1946). 
 17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (codifying the elements for a Section 
43(a) claim). 
 18. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
 19. See generally id. (holding that the FDCA does not preclude Lanham Act 
claims challenging food and beverage labels, but leaving open the possibility that 
THE OFF-LABEL USE OF POM WONDERFUL 597 
the FDCA does not preclude challenges to food and beverage labels 
brought under the Lanham Act, courts have since recognized 
preclusion in limited situations involving drug labels.20 Thus, this 
Note seeks to address whether the current approaches to FDA 
preclusion of Lanham Act claims effectively bar competitors’ 
actions under Section 43(a), and, if so, whether courts should 
establish an exception for claims involving the promotion of 
off-label medication uses.  
Part II provides a more in-depth background of the statutes at 
issue, along with a discussion about how POM Wonderful has 
helped create this potential dilemma.21 The Note then explores 
recent trends in litigation under both the FDCA and the Lanham 
Act to demonstrate how the two statutes complement each other 
in the regulation of off-label promotion.22 Part III summarizes 
current arguments regarding the efficacy of off-label medication 
use and attempts to determine what level of regulation will best 
serve the public.23  
Ultimately, the Note argues that the promotion of off-label 
drug uses does not fit neatly into the current framework for 
statutory preclusion that courts have established after POM 
Wonderful.24 Thus, the question remains whether the FDCA 
precludes, or should preclude, Lanham Act claims that seek to 
challenge false or misleading promotion of off-label medication 
uses.25 Part IV analyzes off-label promotion under the current 
preclusion framework to highlight potential problems in 
application.26 Part V then argues that while Lanham Act claims 
                                                                                                     
FDA regulations may preclude drug-related claims). 
 20. See infra note 30 (citing to post-POM Wonderful decisions that have 
barred Lanham Act claims out of deference to the FDA). 
 21. See infra Part II (describing the history of the FDCA and Lanham Act). 
 22. See infra Parts III.A–B (focusing on First Amendment challenges to the 
FDA’s regulations and whether the FDA’s drug regulations preclude Lanham Act 
claims). 
 23. See infra Part III (introducing statistics about current off-label 
medication use).  
 24. See infra Part IV (outlining two approaches to preclusion that courts 
have applied since POM Wonderful). 
 25. See infra Part IV (applying post-POM Wonderful methods of preclusion 
to off-label promotion). 
 26. See infra Part IV (noting the difficulty of applying current approaches to 
off-label promotion). 
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typically cannot challenge a product regulated under the FDA’s 
drug enforcement authority, recent applications of POM 
Wonderful should not extend to Lanham Act claims challenging 
manufacturers’ promotion of drugs for off-label uses.27  
II. A Comparison of the FDCA and the  Lanham Act, and Their 
Application in POM Wonderful 
Although the FDCA and Lanham Act largely serve different 
purposes, courts previously struggled to find a balance between the 
“misbranding” provisions of the FDCA and false advertising 
challenges under the Lanham Act.28 The Supreme Court 
eventually provided a definitive statement of the statutes’ 
complementary nature in the regulation of food and beverage 
labeling in POM Wonderful.29 Nonetheless, courts continue to face 
confusion as they attempt to apply POM Wonderful to cases 
involving more highly regulated products—specifically, drug labels 
and advertising.30 
                                                                                                     
 27. See infra Part V (suggesting a return to the reasoning of POM 
Wonderful). 
 28. See, e.g., PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(reasoning that private parties cannot bring a Lanham Act claim that would 
require a court to litigate an underlying violation of the FDCA); Schering-Plough 
Healthcare Prods. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(dismissing plaintiff’s claim because the relief sought would amount to a label 
change requiring FDA approval); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
443 F. Supp. 2d 453, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (acknowledging the lack of a private 
right of action under the FDCA but, nonetheless, permitting a claim brought 
under Section 43(a)). 
 29. See generally POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 
(2014) (addressing whether the FDCA’s regulation of food and beverage labels 
precludes Lanham Act claims against manufacturers of food and beverage 
products). 
 30. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 64 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (“[R]epresentations commensurate with information in an FDA [drug] 
label generally cannot form the basis for Lanham Act liability.”); JHP Pharm., 
LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 998–1000 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (considering 
whether the Supreme Court intended POM Wonderful to apply to drug labels); 
see also Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, 843 
F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2016) (“We see no reason why the subjugation of Defendant’s 
[medical device] labeling to FDA regulation . . . should categorically immunize it 
from Lanham Act claims by competitors . . . .”). 
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A. FDCA 
The first major attempt at regulating food and drugs came in 
1906 through the enactment of the Food and Drugs Act.31 In an 
effort to quell a spike in the interstate shipment of adulterated 
foods, Dr. Harvey Wiley, then Chief Chemist for the Department 
of Agriculture, lobbied for the federal act using results of 
experiments showing the harmful effects of certain food 
additives.32 Though this first legislation provided only weak 
guidance, it established a basis for later national food and drug 
regulation.33 Not until 1938, however, did drug manufacturers 
need approval before marketing their medications.34 
The FDA attributes its new drug process in part to the 
marketing of elixir sulfanilamide, a toxic remedy for streptococcal 
infections developed in 1937 by S.E. Massengill Co.35 After 
receiving requests for a liquid form of sulfanilamide, the drug’s 
manufacturer mixed the existing compound with diethylene 
glycol—a chemical now used in antifreeze.36 Because no federal 
regulation existed to ensure the safety and effectiveness of 
medications before marketing, the new liquid medication resulted 
in over one hundred deaths throughout the United States that 
                                                                                                     
 31. See 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION § 3:1, Westlaw (database updated June 2017) (noting that 
Congress had passed several laws attempting to control imported food items, but 
otherwise left responsibility of regulating adulterated food and drug products to 
the states). 
 32. See id. § 3:2 (explaining that the experiment tested common food 
additives and preservatives on volunteer human subjects). 
 33. See id. (characterizing Wiley’s proposal as “a weak and administratively 
cumbersome statute, flawed in significant details,” but “a dramatic step forward 
in consumer protection”). 
 34. See Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 
Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAG., June 1981 (observing that 
it was the 1938 FDCA that increased the FDA’s regulation of drugs). 
 35. See id. (describing the agony patients faced as a result of taking the 
elixir). 
 36. See id. (noting that the company did test the elixir for “flavor, 
appearance, and fragrance and found it satisfactory”). 
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year.37 Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the 1938 Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.38  
Though the FDCA continues to evolve, the purpose remains 
the same: “to protect the health and safety of the public at large” 
by enabling the FDA to promulgate regulations that seek to 
eliminate fraud and false claims in the labeling and advertisement 
of products under its jurisdiction.39 While food and cosmetics 
certainly pose health risks, however, it appears drugs have 
received substantially more attention from the FDA, as Congress 
has continued to expand the FDCA in ongoing efforts to protect the 
public from harmful medications.40 Noted FDCA scholar James 
O’Reilly highlights several Supreme Court cases that additionally 
solidify judicial deference to the FDA in the context of drug 
regulation.41 Two of these cases, Wienberger v. Hynson, Westcott & 
Dunning, Inc.42 (Hynson) and United States v. Rutherford,43 have 
significant relevance here.44 Hynson established the FDA’s 
“virtually unreviewable authority to determine whether a product 
was or was not a ‘new drug’ and thus within the FDA’s regulatory 
jurisdiction.”45 A few years later, the Court confirmed this 
authority in Rutherford by stating that “[u]nless and until 
                                                                                                     
 37. See id. (stating that while there was no law illegalizing the selling of toxic 
drugs at the time, it “was, undoubtedly, bad for business”). 
 38. See id. (suggesting that the incident did not merely hasten the FDCA’s 
enactment, but led to the regulation of new drugs). 
 39. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2234 (2014); see 
also O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 31, § 14:1 (listing some of the methods 
through which the FDCA impacts drug safety); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (“To prohibit the movement in 
interstate commerce of adulterated and misbranded food, drugs, devices, and 
cosmetics, and for other purposes.”). 
 40. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2235 (noting the difference between 
drug and food regulations). 
 41. See James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: 
Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 939, 943–45 (2008) (providing a brief history of the cases that have expanded 
deference to the FDA).  
 42. 412 U.S. 609 (1973). 
 43. 442 U.S. 544 (1979). 
 44. See O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 944 (commenting on how these cases 
granted the FDA substantial authority over drug regulations). 
 45. Id.; see also Hynson, 412 U.S. at 627 (“[The FDA’s] jurisdiction to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction is as essential to its effective operation as 
is a court’s like power.”). 
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Congress [corrects the Court’s misinterpretation of the FDCA], we 
are reluctant to disturb a longstanding administrative policy that 
comports with the plain language, history, and prophylactic 
purpose of the Act.”46 Essentially, these cases reflect the Supreme 
Court’s unwillingness to interfere with FDA expertise in the realm 
of drug regulation.47 POM Wonderful arguably provides yet 
another example of this deference through the Court’s 
caveat-in-dictum, distinguishing the strict regulation of drugs 
from the agency’s more relaxed approach to food and beverages.48  
In addition to broad discretion over new drug applications, 
Congress provided the FDA sole enforcement authority over the 
FDCA and FDA regulations.49 Rather than relying merely on the 
post hoc methods of enforcement used in food and beverage 
regulation, however, Congress mandated that the FDA approve 
medications and labels before marketing.50 The agency also retains 
post-approval methods of enforcement such as warning letters or 
enforcement actions against manufacturers, which it may use to 
police misbranding of medications, unapproved drugs, or other 
unsafe practices as defined by either the statute or FDA 
regulations.51 Through these enforcement actions, the FDA can 
assign criminal or civil liability resulting in monetary fines, 
                                                                                                     
 46. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 554. 
 47. See O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 944 (suggesting that Hynson and 
Rutherford granted the FDA the power to determine its own jurisdiction over drug 
regulation). 
 48. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2014) 
(“[T]he FDA does not preapprove juice labels. That contrasts with the FDA’s 
regulation of other types of labels, such as drug labels, and is consistent with the 
less extensive role the FDA plays in the regulation of food than in the regulation 
of drugs.” (citation omitted)). 
 49. See 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2012) (“[A]ll such proceedings for the 
enforcement . . . of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United 
States.”). The FDA has allowed petitions by either citizens or “interested persons” 
if they believe another party has violated the statute or regulations. See 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 10.25, 10.30 (2017) (setting out rules for such petitions). 
 50. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (requiring that “[n]o person shall introduce or 
deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug” until the drug 
receives preapproval by the FDA). 
 51. See O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 31, § 7.1 (providing a brief 
overview of the FDA’s enforcement methods); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 835–38 (1985) (establishing the FDA’s broad prosecutorial discretion). 
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injunctions, exclusion from the market, or withdrawal of drug 
approval.52 
As a part of the premarket approval process, the FDCA and its 
accompanying regulations require drug labels to include certain 
efficacy information for every intended use of the drug, and the 
FDA will refuse an application if it discovers any “misbranding.”53 
Misbranding occurs, for example, when a drug’s label or 
advertising contains false or misleading information, or when the 
label does not include adequate warnings and directions for use.54 
Consequently, the FDA has prohibited the promotion of drugs for 
off-label uses, or those uses for which the drugs have not received 
approval.55 For example, because off-label drug promotion 
advertises unintended uses, for which the labels do not contain 
adequate directions, the FDA has used such promotion as evidence 
of mislabeling under the FDCA.56 This prohibition, however, has 
led to a dispute over whether the FDA’s interpretation violates 
drug manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.57 
In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,58 the seminal 
case challenging FDA limitations on unapproved promotion, the 
Supreme Court held that the FDA could not prohibit the 
advertisement of compounded drugs.59 Thompson arose from the 
FDA’s attempt to prohibit a process through which pharmacists 
would combine drugs to tailor their effects to the needs of 
individual patients.60 To prevent harmful side effects, the FDA 
                                                                                                     
 52. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333, 335a–c (detailing the penalties available 
through FDA enforcement actions). 
 53. See id. § 331(b) (prohibiting misbranding). 
 54. See id. § 352 (defining when a drug will be considered “misbranded”). 
 55. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(deciding that the FDA’s evidentiary use of off-label promotion to prove 
misbranding under the FDCA was an attempt to criminalize the act of off-label 
promotion). 
 56. See id. at 160 (“Specifically, the government argues that . . . ‘the 
promotion of off-label uses plays an evidentiary role in determining whether a 
drug is misbranded under 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1).”’). 
 57. See id. at 168 (holding that the FDA cannot prosecute manufacturers for 
truthful off-label promotion). 
 58. 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
 59. See id. at 377 (invalidating the speech-related provisions of the Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 503A as unconstitutional). 
 60. See id. at 360–61 (describing the process and purpose of drug 
compounding). 
THE OFF-LABEL USE OF POM WONDERFUL 603 
monitored the promotion of these compounded medications until 
Congress officially criminalized advertising by the pharmacists in 
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 
(FDAMA).61 The Supreme Court recognized the utility of such a 
ban in “[p]reserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s 
new drug approval process,” but it rejected the notion that the FDA 
could regulate this commercial speech.62 Citing the government’s 
concurrent interest in ensuring access to necessary medical 
treatment, the Court held that the FDA’s prohibition “does not 
appear to directly further any asserted governmental objective.”63 
Since Thompson, the FDA has encountered additional challenges 
to its regulations under the First Amendment. This Note revisits 
the FDA’s struggle to find an appropriate regulatory approach to 
the promotion of off-label medications in Part III.64 
B. Lanham Act Section 43(a) 
At the time of its conception, the Lanham Act purported to 
create a broad federal law proscribing unfair competition,65 with 
Section 43(a) focusing on protecting consumers from the deception 
of false advertising.66 Although the drafters of the Lanham Act 
intended Section 43(a) to play a minor role in the legislation,67 a 
wave of cases by creative plaintiffs’ attorneys in the 1970s and ‘80s 
made it the primary vehicle for protecting consumers from false 
                                                                                                     
 61. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296; see also Thompson, 535 U.S. at 363–65 (noting that the 
FDA and the FDAMA did not allow pharmacists to promote compounded drugs). 
 62. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 369.  
 63. Id. at 377. 
 64. See infra Part III.A (detailing several cases in which courts struck FDA 
regulations for violating the First Amendment). 
 65. See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 27:7, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017) (adding that courts 
have since declined to recognize the Lanham Act as a comprehensive federal 
unfair competition law). 
 66. See id. § 27:25 (noting that the broad protections of Section 43(a) lead to 
several advantages not provided by the common law). 
 67. See id. § 27:7 (explaining that the original draft of Section 43(a) was 
intended only to “ease the restrictive requirements of proof in the common law 
false advertising cases”).  
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advertising.68 Accordingly, Congress amended Section 43(a) in 
1989, officially broadening its scope and splitting the provision into 
two separate “prongs”: infringement and false advertising.69 
While the statute creates a cause of action for “[a]ny person,”70 
courts have determined that only competitors may bring claims 
under the statute, leaving consumers to rely on private companies 
to police these unfair trade practices.71 Considering, however, that 
“competitors have the greatest interest in stopping misleading 
advertising, . . . and in many situations . . . the greatest resources 
to devote to a lawsuit,”72 the lack of standing for an individual to 
sue should not lessen the protection provided to consumers. While 
unfair practices undoubtedly harm consumers, competitors’ 
interests in recovering lost profits or enjoining misleading 
advertising adequately fulfill Congress’s intent “to protect persons 
engaged in such commerce against unfair competition.”73  
To state a prima facie claim for false advertising, competitors 
must plead with the requisite specificity74 that the defendant has 
used, for the purpose of advertising or promoting in interstate 
commerce, any false or misleading information that 
“misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic 
origin” of their, or a competitor’s, product.75 Plaintiffs must further 
demonstrate that they have been or likely will be damaged by 
these acts.76  
                                                                                                     
 68. See id. § 27:8 (detailing the expansion of Section 43(a) by courts). 
 69. See id. § 27:9 (observing that before Congress rewrote Section 43(a), both 
potential claims stemmed from the same language, which prohibited “false 
designation of origin” and “false description or representation”). 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). 
 71. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1377, 1388–90 (2014) (“A consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a 
disappointing product may well have an injury-in-fact cognizable under Article 
III, but he cannot invoke the protection of the Lanham Act . . . .”); Barrus v. 
Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that standing requires 
commercial injury “harmful to the plaintiff’s ability to compete with the 
defendant,” which excludes individual claims).  
 72. Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 74. See MCCARTHY, supra note 65, § 27:24 (noting that some courts require 
more specific pleading for false advertising based on the Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b) standard for claims of fraud). 
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).  
 76. See Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1384 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) to 
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Successful claims may result in either preliminary or 
permanent injunctive relief based upon the likelihood or actual 
presence of harm, and could include a requirement of corrective 
advertising to inform consumers of the false or misleading 
claims.77 In addition to injunctive relief, plaintiffs may recover the 
defendant’s profits from the unfair marketing campaign, damages 
sustained by the plaintiff, and costs of litigating.78 Further, while 
plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages under the Lanham Act, 
“[a] court may enter judgment . . . for any sum above the amount 
found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount,” 
allowing some variance for inadequate or excessive rewards.79  
Even though the Lanham Act seeks to deter unfair 
competition, courts have hesitated to allow competitors to bring 
claims against products regulated by the FDCA.80 Some courts 
reasoned that if a product’s labeling met the requirements of the 
FDCA, which sought to prevent the sale of adulterated or 
misbranded products, then any Lanham Act challenge would 
inevitably conflict with the FDCA.81 Others, however, would allow 
claims that did not require interpretation or application of the 
                                                                                                     
highlight the elements of damage and proximate cause).  
 77. See MCCARTHY, supra note 65, § 27:37 (describing available injunctive 
relief and the burdens plaintiffs face to obtain such remedy). 
 78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (including attorney fees “in exceptional 
cases”). 
 79. See id. (noting that any variation shall not serve as punitive damages, 
but as compensation to the plaintiff). 
 80. See, e.g., Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, 
GmbH, 843 F.3d 48, 73 n.13 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing that Lanham Act claims 
generally cannot challenge FDA labels); Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 
823 F.3d 51, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (suggesting that barring Lanham Act claims that 
challenge drug labels reflects an appropriate deference to the FDA); Alpharma, 
Inc. v. Pennfield Oil Co., 411 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to apply the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1139 
(4th Cir. 1993) (dismissing a claim of misrepresentation because plaintiffs 
improperly sought to enforce the FDCA); Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. 
Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 230–32 (3d Cir. 1990) (questioning whether 
allowing a Lanham Act challenge to defendant’s drug label would usurp the FDA’s 
authority); JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 998–1000 (C.D. 
Cal. 2014) (establishing a presumption that Lanham Act claims may challenge 
products regulated by the FDA). 
 81. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 
2012) (deferring to the expertise of the FDA by dismissing a claim challenging a 
drink label that appeared to comply with FDA regulations), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2228 
(2014). 
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FDCA or FDA regulations.82 This disagreement reached its peak 
when the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the debate in POM 
Wonderful v. Coca-Cola.83 
C. A Comparison of the Lanham Act and the FDCA in 
POM Wonderful 
In 2014, the Lanham Act and the FDCA collided after 
Coca-Cola began marketing its new pomegranate-blueberry 
juice.84 While Coca-Cola’s label contained the words “pomegranate 
blueberry” in large font and all capital letters, along with a 
vignette that showed blueberries, grapes, raspberries, and a 
halved pomegranate, the juice itself contained only 0.3% 
pomegranate juice and 0.2% blueberry juice.85 POM Wonderful 
LLC (POM), a competitor of Coca-Cola as a grower and distributor 
of pomegranate juices, sued Coca-Cola under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.86 POM challenged the label as misleading, explaining 
that consumers “have no way on God’s green earth of telling that 
the total amount of blueberry and pomegranate juice in this 
product can be dispensed with a single eyedropper.”87 
Coca-Cola contested the suit, asserting that the FDCA’s 
prohibition on misbranded food and drinks and the juice label’s 
                                                                                                     
 82. See PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010) (barring 
a Lanham Act claim as an attempt to enforce the FDCA); Schering-Plough 
Healthcare Prods. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(suggesting that a direct conflict between a Lanham Act claim and FDA 
regulations may create a preclusive effect). 
 83. See generally POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 
2234 (2014) (resolving whether the FDCA precludes a Lanham Act challenge to a 
food or beverage regulation). 
 84. See id. at 2235 (laying out a summary of the facts). 
 85. See id. (“Below those words, Coca-Cola placed the phrase ‘flavored blend 
of 5 juices’ in much smaller type.”). 
 86. See id. (“POM alleged that the name, label, marketing, and 
advertising . . . mislead consumers into believing the product consists 
predominantly of pomegranate and blueberry juice when it in fact consists 
predominantly of less expensive apple and grape juices.”). 
 87. See Oral Argument at 15:23, POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 
S. Ct. 2228 (2014) (No. 12-761), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts 
6/oral_argument_audio/23517 (adding that “[i]t amounts to a teaspoon in a half 
gallon”). 
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compliance with FDA regulations precluded POM’s claim.88 The 
District Court granted partial summary judgment for Coca-Cola, 
explaining that “the ‘FDA has directly spoken on the issues that 
form the basis of POM’s Lanham Act claim against the naming and 
labeling of’ Coca-Cola’s product, but has not prohibited any, and 
indeed expressly has permitted some, aspects of Coca-Cola’s 
label.”89 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, reasoning that 
“the Lanham Act may not be used as a vehicle to usurp, preempt, 
or undermine FDA authority.”90 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties tasked the Court 
with choosing between competing canons of statutory 
interpretation.91 POM suggested that courts “give full effect to both 
statutes unless they are in ‘irreconcilable conflict,’” whereas 
Coca-Cola sought to have the more specific FDCA narrow the scope 
of the Lanham Act.92 The Court declined to accept either 
argument.93 Instead, it first searched both the FDCA and the 
Lanham Act for a provision expressly limiting their coequal 
application before considering whether the statutes were 
                                                                                                     
 88. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2239 (pointing to a congressional goal 
of “national uniformity in food and beverage labeling”). When discussing 
preclusion of one federal statute’s cause of action by another federal statute, the 
Note uses the term “statutory preclusion.” This is not to be confused with 
legislative preclusion of judicial review in the context of administrative law. See 
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12.5 (2d ed. 
2001) (detailing generally the limitations to judicial review of agency action 
through express legislative statements included in organic statutes). 
 89. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2236 (quoting POM Wonderful LLC v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 849, 871 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 679 F.3d 1170 (9th 
Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014)). 
 90. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 
2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
 91. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2236–37 
(2014) (explaining that the problem of competing interpretive maxims is not 
unique to POM Wonderful). 
 92. Id. at 2237. 
 93. See id. (noting that the “Court does not need to resolve this dispute” 
because, in either case, the FDCA does not preclude POM’s claim). Although the 
Court declined to apply either rule in POM Wonderful, it hinted at the idea that 
a direct conflict between the statutes would create a preclusive effect. See id. at 
2240 (“Because, as we have explained, the FDCA and the Lanham Act are 
complementary and have separate scopes and purposes, this greater specificity 
would matter only if the Lanham Act and the FDCA cannot be implemented in 
full at the same time.”). 
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conflicting or complementary in nature.94 Through this approach, 
the Court determined that the FDCA does not expressly preclude 
the Lanham Act, and that, instead, the two statutes complement 
each other through their distinct scopes and purposes.95 Moreover, 
the Court warned that the ability of the FDA’s sole enforcement 
power to police unfair market practices pales in comparison to the 
expertise of market competitors.96 
Ultimately, however, the Court narrowed its holding to food 
and beverage regulations, leaving open the possibility that the 
FDCA might still preclude Lanham Act claims challenging 
products more heavily regulated by the FDA, such as drugs.97 
Significantly, labels for drugs and some medical devices require 
preapproval by the FDA, which involves a detailed description of 
the products’ quality, safety, and effectiveness, and a review of the 
proposed labeling.98 Because the FDCA and its accompanying 
regulations involve a more comprehensive examination of the 
claims made by pharmaceutical companies as compared to those 
                                                                                                     
 94. See id. at 2237–38 (pointing to the lack of an express provision as 
‘“powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the 
exclusive means’ of ensuring proper food and beverage labeling” (quoting Wyeth 
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009))). 
 95. See id. at 2241 (rejecting Coca-Cola’s preclusion argument because 
“Congress did not intend the FDCA to preclude Lanham Act suits like POM’s”). 
 96. See id. at 2238 (“The FDA, however, does not have the same perspective 
or expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors 
possess. . . . [Competitors’] awareness of unfair competition practices may be far 
more immediate and accurate than that of agency rulemakers and regulators.”). 
 97. See id. at 2233 (“[T]he FDCA and the Lanham Act complement each 
other in the federal regulation of misleading food and beverage labels.”); see also 
Andrew Baum, Supreme Court Holds that Lanham Act False Advertising Claims 
Are Not Preempted by FDCA, HEALTH CARE L. TODAY (June, 20, 2014), 
https://www.healthcarelawtoday.com/2014/06/20/supreme-court-holds-that-
lanham-act-false-advertising-claims-are-not-preempted-by-fdca/ (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2018) (observing that “the Court might take a different view if drug 
labeling were at issue”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 98. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012) (listing requirements for preapproval of 
drugs through the FDA’s NDA process); FDA Regulation of Drugs Versus Dietary 
Supplements, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments-
and-side-effects/complementary-and-alternative-medicine/dietary-
supplements/fda-regulations.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2015) (last visited Feb. 
18, 2018) [hereinafter FDA Regulation] (outlining the approval process of new 
drugs, and the conditions placed on the manufacturer by the FDA) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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made by food and beverage manufacturers,99 the FDA sees fewer 
instances of mislabeling.100 Nonetheless, lower courts have 
continued to rely on pre-POM Wonderful precedent for 
drug-related cases, demonstrating an unwillingness to interfere 
with FDA regulations.101  
For example, in Perez v. Nidek Co.,102 the Southern District of 
California dismissed state-law claims of unfair competition against 
a defendant medical device promoter, noting that “it was not 
proper for a district court to ‘usurp administrative agencies’ 
responsibility for interpreting and enforcing potentially 
ambiguous [FDA] regulations.’”103 Though Perez did not involve the 
Lanham Act, courts resolving state-law claims have typically 
relied on the same precedent that formed the basis of post-POM 
Wonderful preclusion arguments.104 Similarly, the Central District 
of California has held that “insofar as Plaintiffs’ claims are based 
solely on allegations that Defendants promoted [their drug] for 
off-label purposes, they constitute an impermissible attempt to 
                                                                                                     
 99. See FDA Regulation, supra note 98, at 5–7 (comparing regulation of 
drugs versus dietary supplements, which more closely resembles food). 
 100. See Comments on FDA Enforcement of Drug Advertising Regulations, 
PUB. CITIZEN (Oct. 28, 2002), http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=3336#_ftnref3 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (showing a decline in the number of drug enforcement 
actions after the FDA began regulating the advertising of unapproved drug and 
medical device uses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see 
id. (expressing concern over the insufficient number of employees available to 
review advertisements). 
 101. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 64, 64 n.9 
(2d Cir. 2016) (barring Lanham Act claims challenging statements consistent 
with FDA-approved labeling (citing Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 
443 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))); JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. 
Supp. 3d 992, 999–1005 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (suggesting that primary jurisdiction, 
affirmative policy decision, conflict with an FDA-preapproved labeling scheme, 
and potentially drug labels in general may require preclusion (citing PhotoMedex, 
Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2010))); Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera 
Med. Corp., No. 2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (D. Utah July 17, 2014) 
(leaving enforcement of the FDCA to the FDA (citing PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 
601 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2010))). 
 102. 657 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2009). 
 103. Id. at 1165 (quoting Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 
F.2d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 104. See, e.g., id. at 1165 (citing PhotoMedex, Inc. v. RA Med. Sys. Inc., No. 
04CV24JLS (CAB), 2007 WL 3203039 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2007), aff’d sub nom., 
PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
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bring a private suit for violations of the FDCA.”105 The court 
continued, however, to say that if “Plaintiffs can identify specific 
representations . . . that are literally false, misleading or contain 
material omissions, the claims are actionable” under California’s 
consumer fraud laws.106  
Conversely, the Eighth Circuit allowed a Section 43(a) claim 
where the manufacturer of a drug approved to treat only 
hypertension advertised its product as a “miracle drug” for the 
treatment of angina.107 Likewise, the Southern District of New 
York has held that although “courts have rejected attempts . . . to 
create a private cause of action to challenge a manufacturer or 
distributor’s sale of an FDA approved drug for off-label use,” 
certain claims involving false assertions of FDA approval could 
proceed.108 Thus, it appears that whether the FDCA or FDA 
regulations preclude Lanham Act claims challenging off-label 
promotion remains largely undecided, as courts vary on how 
strictly they apply POM Wonderful.  
III. The Rise of Off-Label Medication Use and Issues 
Inhibiting Regulation 
As the stories of Jeremy Lew and Lisa Rosendahl illustrate, 
the potential gain from off-label drug use might offset many of the 
associated public health risks, but such use could also result in 
devastating pain and suffering.109 These conflicting results have 
led to a substantial debate among both lawyers and medical 
professionals about the safety of off-label treatments.110 Studies 
                                                                                                     
 105. In re Epogen & Arenesp Off-Label Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 590 F. 
Supp. 2d 1282, 1292 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 
F.3d 511, 513 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding the finding that defendant violated the 
Lanham Act). 
 108. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 443 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing PDK Labs v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
 109. See supra Part I (discussing Lew’s nerve damage and the life-saving 
treatment of Rosendahl, both resulting from off-label treatments). 
 110. See Teresa Carr, Off-Label Use: Should Drugs Do Double Duty?, 
CONSUMER REP. (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.consumerreports.org/drugs/off-label-
use-should-drugs-do-double-duty/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (reporting that drug 
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have shown that off-label uses account for approximately 20% of 
all prescribed treatments,111 and that up to about 75% of those 
medications lack scientific evidence of efficacy.112 In some cases, 
these uses provide hope for otherwise helpless patients, targeting 
cancers or rare diseases that may have no existing treatments.113 
As such, supporters of off-label use seek to increase the availability 
of drugs and efficacy data for unapproved uses.114 
                                                                                                     
companies seek to relax rules about off-label use and promotion while consumers 
typically want the FDA involved to prevent misleading advertising) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 111. See Tracy Hampton, Experts Weigh in on Promotion, Prescription of 
Off-Label Drugs, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 683, 683 (2007) (“21% of the 725 million 
total drug prescriptions reported . . . lacked FDA approval for the condition they 
were used to treat.”); Timothy O’Shea, 10 Surprising Off-Label Uses for 
Prescription Medications, PHARMACYTIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/contributor/timothy-o-shea/2016/01/10-
surprising-off-label-uses-for-prescription-medications (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) 
(“It is estimated that up to 20% of all medications prescribed are for indications 
that are not approved by the FDA.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the 
Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008) (“[F]or the 3 leading 
drugs in each of the 15 leading drug classes, off-label use accounted for 
approximately 21% of prescriptions.”). 
 112. See Carr, supra note 110 (“[M]ore than 80 percent of off-label prescribing 
by doctors lacked strong scientific evidence.”); Hampton, supra note 111, at 683 
(“[Seventy-three percent] of off-label uses lacked evidence of clinical efficacy, and 
only 27% were supported by strong scientific evidence.”); Stafford, supra note 111, 
at 1427 (“[M]ost off-label drug uses (73%) were shown to have little or no scientific 
support.”); Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions (and Their 
Answers) About Off-Label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 982, 983 (2012) 
(“[Seventy-three percent] of medications prescribed for an off-label use had poor 
or no scientific support.”). 
 113. See Hampton, supra note 111, at 1427 (“[Fifty percent] to 75% of all uses 
of drugs in cancer care in the United States are off-label . . . . [A]pproximately 
90% of patients with rare diseases are given at least one drug that is off-label.”); 
see also Kelli Miller, Off-Label Drug Use: What You Need to Know, WEBMD (2009), 
http://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/features/off-label-drug-use-what-you-need-
to-know#1 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“According to the American Cancer Society, 
cancer treatment often involves using certain chemotherapy drugs off-label, 
because a chemotherapy drug approved for one type of cancer may actually target 
many different types of tumors.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 114. See Stafford, supra note 111, at 1427 (acknowledging that off-label 
promotion gives doctors and patients the benefit of “earlier access to potentially 
valuable medications”). See generally James M. Spears et al., Embracing 21st 
Century Information Sharing: Defining a New Paradigm for the Food and Drug 
Administration’s Regulation of Biopharmaceutical Company Communications 
with Healthcare Professionals, 70 FOOD DRUG L.J. 143 (2015) (arguing for a 
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Not all uses stem from a lack of alternative treatments, 
however, and some result merely from incomplete clinical 
testing.115 For example, “three fourths of the prescription drugs on 
the market do not have labeling indications for children, leaving 
their use in children to physicians’ discretion.”116 Psychiatric 
medications also often lack sufficient clinical data, as “[p]atients 
with psychiatric disorders are often excluded from clinical trials, 
and these disorders are inherently difficult to study.”117 So, while 
some off-label uses might treat otherwise untreatable conditions, 
opponents of off-label use suggest that the benefits do not outweigh 
the potential negative side effects of using a medication with 
limited clinical efficacy information.118 Instead, they argue that the 
promotion of such uses serves only to increase profits of the 
pharmaceutical companies.119 As such, they push for increased 
regulation and postmarket enforcement of prohibitions on off-label 
use and promotion.120 
                                                                                                     
relaxation of FDA regulation of off-label promotion, among other things, so that 
physicians can receive the most recent information about the medications they 
prescribe and to avoid violating First Amendment rights). 
 115. See Hampton, supra note 111, at 683 (explaining that treatments can be 
difficult to test on some populations). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Wittich et al., supra note 112, at 983; see also Hampton, supra note 111, 
at 683 (noting that 96% of the off-label uses of psychiatric prescriptions had little 
or no support—the greatest disparity in support of studied medications); Susan 
Ipaktchian, 14 Drugs Identified as Most Urgently Needing Study for Off-Label 
Use, Stanford Professor Says, STAN. MED. (Nov. 24, 2008), 
https://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2008/11/14-drugs-identified-as-most-
urgently-needing-study-for-off-label-use-stanford-professor-says.html (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2018) (listing fourteen drugs in need of clinical testing for off-label 
use, nine of which are most commonly used to treat psychiatric disorders) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Stafford, supra note 111, at 1427 
(observing that 60% of antipsychotics are prescribed off-label). 
 118. See Carr, supra note 110 (“[P]atients were 54 percent more likely to 
experience some kind of harm . . . compared with those taking the same drug for 
an approved use.”); O’Shea, supra note 111 (“[T]he rate of side effects for off-label 
drugs was 44% higher than on-label ones.”). 
 119. See Carr, supra note 110 (suggesting that, contrary to pharmaceutical 
companies’ claims, their ultimate goal is “to sell products”). 
 120. See id. (observing that “allowing drug companies to distribute off-label 
marketing materials . . . isn’t helpful because it’s likely to be biased,” and 
“consumers want the FDA involved” so they know of any side effects and of the 
efficacy of suggested uses); Hampton, supra note 111, at 684 (“Experts note that 
changes may be needed. ‘It might be helpful to adopt a more aggressive 
postmarket surveillance system, and that could be done using data collected 
THE OFF-LABEL USE OF POM WONDERFUL 613 
Certainly, the FDA should attempt to regulate the negative 
effects of off-label prescribing; but, at some point, the benefit from 
unapproved use likely outweighs the risk. Two issues have gained 
momentum over recent years that will ultimately play a role in 
determining the best method for regulating off-label promotion: 
First, the FDA’s efforts to criminalize the misbranding of drugs by 
companies marketing them for off-label uses have led to litigation 
over First Amendment violations, as the regulations limit 
manufacturers’ ability to promote their products.121 Second, courts 
have distinguished POM Wonderful’s holding—that the FDCA 
does not preclude the Lanham Act—when Section 43(a) claims 
challenge medication labels.122 When viewed together, the two 
issues create a potential paradox: FDA drug regulations preclude 
Lanham Act claims, but the FDA cannot effectively punish 
manufacturers who peddle drugs for off-label uses.123 Thus, the 
best method of regulating off-label promotion might be to carve out 
an exception to the modern application of POM Wonderful in order 
to allow competitors to sue under Section 43(a), effectively 
supporting the FDA’s goal of protecting consumer safety. 
A. Pharmaceutical Companies Challenge FDA Regulations as 
Violating the First Amendment 
Although the FDCA does not expressly prohibit off-label drug 
marketing, the FDA has interpreted the statute’s misbranding 
                                                                                                     
by other players in the healthcare system—for instance, insurance companies or 
HMOs . . . .’”); Stafford, supra note 111, at 1429 (warning against a relaxation of 
FDA regulations, and recommending that the agency “take an active role in 
fostering evidence-based practice . . . and requiring a balanced and fair 
presentation of scientific evidence”). 
 121. See infra Part III.A (summarizing recent First-Amendment challenges 
to FDA regulations). 
 122. See infra Part III.B (outlining post-POM Wonderful approaches to 
preclusion in the context of drug labels). 
 123. See infra Parts III.A–B (detailing these two issues). If the information in 
a promotion or advertisement is false, both methods may provide legal recourse; 
however, courts have interpreted the phrase “false and misleading” differently for 
the FDCA and the Lanham Act. See Kathryn Bi, Comment, What is “False or 
Misleading” Off-Label Promotion?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 975, 999 (2015) (arguing 
that courts should interpret “false or misleading” uniformly across statutes with 
this language). 
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provisions to criminalize the practice.124 Attempts to enforce the 
criminal provisions, however, have led to several recent court 
decisions admonishing the regulations as violations of the First 
Amendment.125 The Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson 
signaled the beginning of a decrease in FDA enforcement authority 
by holding that criminal prosecution for advertising compounded 
drugs did not directly advance a substantial governmental 
interest.126 But, even after the FDA amended its sanctions in an 
effort to prevent future constitutional challenges, the agency has 
largely continued its criminal prohibition on off-label promotion of 
medications.127 Despite the FDA’s shift in regulations, the 
Supreme Court found in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.128 that 
“[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of 
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.”129 Moreover, the conflicting government interests 
asserted in Thompson remain, as some pharmaceuticals have 
                                                                                                     
 124. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j) (2008) (considering off-label promotion to be 
misbranding under the FDCA); United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153–55 
(2d Cir. 2012) (outlining the FDA’s argument that off-label promotion of a 
medication amounts to evidence of misbranding because the drug’s label does not 
include adequate directions for the unapproved use); In re Epogen & Aranesp 
Off-Label Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 
2008) (providing a detailed roadmap of relevant FDCA and FDA rules through 
which the agency has sought to prohibit off-label promotion). 
 125. See, e.g., Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152 (agreeing with appellant that his 
conviction for promoting an off-label use violated the First Amendment); Amarin 
Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (“Amarin claims that the FDA’s threat of a misbranding action is chilling it 
from engaging in constitutionally protected truthful speech.”); see also Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011) (declaring a Vermont law 
unconstitutional because it limited the ability of pharmaceutical manufacturers 
to engage in protected speech); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 
377 (2002) (striking speech-related provisions of the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 as unconstitutional for prohibiting 
promotion of compounded drugs without directly furthering a government 
interest). 
 126. See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 369 (noting that the government has 
competing interests of “[p]reserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s 
new drug approval process” and “permitting the continuation of the 
practice . . . so that patients with particular needs may obtain medications suited 
to those needs”).  
 127. See Amarin Pharma, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 207–08 (discussing the FDA’s 
attempt to limit Amarin’s promotion under the agency’s narrower regulations). 
 128. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 129. Id. at 557. 
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commonly known and effective off-label uses.130 As the government 
has conceded, “because obtaining FDA approval for a new drug is 
a costly process, requiring FDA approval . . . for the particular 
needs of an individual patient would, as a practical matter, 
eliminate the practice . . . and thereby eliminate availability 
of . . . drugs for those patients who have no alternative 
treatment.”131 Consequently, the FDA has recently faced 
additional challenges to its regulation of off-label drug 
promotion.132 
In United States v. Caronia,133 the Second Circuit overturned 
the conviction of a pharmaceutical representative for off-label 
promotion and ruled that the FDA’s prosecution violated the First 
Amendment.134 Orphan Medical, Inc. hired Alfred Caronia to 
promote Xyrem, a central nervous system depressant used to treat 
narcolepsy patients with cataplexy135 or excessive daytime 
sleepiness.136 Because of Xyrem’s side effects,137 the FDA required 
                                                                                                     
 130. See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368 (weighing the government’s interests in 
preserving the integrity of the NDA process and maintaining access to 
individualized drug treatments unavailable through FDA-approved uses); 
Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166–67 (examining the government’s interests in preserving 
the “integrity of the FDA’s drug approval process and reducing patient exposure 
to unsafe and ineffective drugs” while recognizing that the FDA has 
acknowledged the benefit of off-label use and promotion); see also U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
RELATED TO MANUFACTURER COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING UNAPPROVED USES OF 
APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL PRODUCTS 3 (2017) (asserting eleven government 
interests that seem to be covered broadly by those asserted in Thompson and 
Caronia). 
 131. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 369 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 19, Thompson 
v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (No. 01-344)). 
 132. See supra note 125 (providing examples of challenges to the FDA’s 
regulations). 
 133. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 134. See id. at 169 (concluding that “the government cannot prosecute 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives under the FDCA for 
speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug”). 
 135. See id. at 155 (defining cataplexy as “a condition associated with weak or 
paralyzed muscles”). 
 136. See id. (noting that the two different uses of the drug were approved at 
different times, showing that off-label uses may eventually qualify for approval). 
 137. See id. (“Xyrem can cause serious side effects, including difficulty 
breathing while asleep, confusion, abnormal thinking, depression, nausea, 
vomiting, dizziness, headache, bedwetting, . . . sleepwalking[,] . . . seizures, 
dependence, severe withdrawal, coma, and death. Xyrem’s active 
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the drug to carry a “black box” warning138 and limited its 
distribution.139 After launching an investigation of Orphan 
Medical, Inc., the FDA recorded a conversation in which Caronia 
promoted Xyrem for “insomnia, Fibromyalgia[,] periodic leg 
movement, restless leg, . . . Parkinson’s and . . . other sleep 
disorders.”140 In later meetings, Caronia also offered evidence of 
safe use in patients younger than the population approved by the 
FDA.141  
The court began its discussion by acknowledging the validity 
of the FDA’s regulation prohibiting mislabeling, but ultimately 
determined that the agency could not use commercial speech as 
evidence of a violation of that regulation.142 Under the agency’s 
interpretation of the FDCA, off-label promotion evidences a 
company’s intended use of the promoted drug.143 As such, the 
agency sought to categorize a drug as mislabeled when the 
manufacturer advertised a use other than those indicated on the 
label.144 The court distinguished mislabeled medications from 
off-label promotion, finding that “the government clearly 
prosecuted Caronia for his . . . speech.”145 
As the Second Circuit analyzed the FDA’s prohibition, it 
applied the heightened scrutiny owed to content-based 
restrictions, but suggested that this application of the regulation 
                                                                                                     
ingredient . . . has been federally classified as the ‘date rape drug . . . .’”). 
 138. See id. (“The black box warning is the most serious warning placed on 
prescription medication labels.”). 
 139. See id. (allowing only one pharmacy to distribute the medication across 
the United States). 
 140. Id. at 156 (alteration in original). 
 141. See id. at 156–57 (quoting Caronia as stating, “[T]here have been reports 
of patients as young as fourteen using it”). 
 142. See id. at 161–62 (suggesting that the use of Caronia’s speech as evidence 
of misbranding effectively amounted to the FDA’s prosecution of speech). 
 143. See id. at 160 (“[T]he government argues that ‘[p]romoting an approved 
drug for off-label uses is not itself a prohibited act under the FDCA’ and ‘the 
promotion of off-label uses plays an evidentiary role in determining whether a 
drug is misbranded under 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1).’” (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Gov’t Br. 51)). 
 144. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4) (2008) (“An advertisement . . . shall not 
recommend or suggest any use that is not in the labeling accepted in such 
approved new-drug application or supplement . . . .”). 
 145. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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would fail even an intermediate-scrutiny test.146 The court noted 
that the prohibition failed to advance directly a government 
interest as required for the government to limit protected 
speech.147 Though the FDA sought to “preserv[e] the efficacy and 
integrity of the FDA’s drug approval process and reduc[e] patient 
exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs,” the agency also knew 
“that approved drugs [would] be used in off-label ways.”148 The 
court found that this contradictory approach “interferes with the 
ability of physicians and patients to receive potentially relevant 
treatment information,” inhibiting the public’s ability to make 
informed treatment decisions.149  
Several years after Caronia, Amarin Pharma, Inc. (Amarin) 
sought review in the Southern District of New York for 
“preliminary relief to ensure its ability to engage in truthful and 
non-misleading speech free from the threat of a misbranding 
action.”150 In Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug 
Administration,151 the plaintiff presented a list of disclosures about 
off-label uses of its drug Vascepa that the company intended to 
disseminate to medical professionals.152 Along with test results 
suggesting the safety and efficacy of the drug, Amarin agreed to 
release statements disclaiming that the medicine had not received 
FDA approval for the suggested uses.153 The court, citing the same 
                                                                                                     
 146. See id. at 164 (“[W]e conclude the government cannot justify a criminal 
prohibition of off-label promotion even under Central Hudson’s less rigorous 
intermediate test.”). But see id. at 182 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (finding no 
reason to overturn Caronia’s conviction, and noting that “the majority’s decision 
today extends heightened scrutiny further than the Supreme Court ever has”). 
 147. See id. at 167 (“[T]he government’s prohibition of off-label promotion by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers ‘provides only ineffective or remote support for 
the government’s purpose.’” (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 
U.S. 484, 504–05 (1996))). 
 148. Id. at 166. 
 149. Id.; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 130, at 26 
(acknowledging that the FDA’s interest are “sometimes competing”). 
 150. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 
198 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 151. 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 152. See id. at 212 (seeking a judgment that the FDA cannot keep the 
pharmaceutical company “from making completely truthful and non-misleading 
statements about its product to sophisticated healthcare professionals”). 
 153. See id. at 215 (listing five disclosures that would inform medical 
professionals of the lack of FDA approval and other potential downsides to the 
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conflicting interests present in Thompson and Caronia, found that 
the FDA could not prosecute Amarin based on the presented 
statements.154 Ultimately, the parties agreed that Amarin could 
promote the drug in a truthful and nonmisleading way.155 
By acknowledging the potential validity of mislabeling 
prohibitions, courts have established that misbranding remains 
actionable, although the evidentiary use of truthful speech likely 
does not.156 How much the agency will compromise on its effective 
prohibition, however, remains unclear.157 In November of 2016, 
after facing defeat in both Caronia and Amarin, the FDA 
considered another shift from its strict prohibition on off-label 
promotion to avoid violating the First Amendment.158 The 
                                                                                                     
drug’s off-label use). 
 154. See id. at 237 (granting Amarin preliminary relief). 
 155. See Deborah Mazer & Gregory Curfman, FDA Sanctions Off-Label Drug 
Promotion, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 19, 2016), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/07/19/fda-sanctions-off-label-drug-promotion/ 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (reporting that the FDA ultimately settled with 
Amarin, in part because the agency had worked with the drug company to develop 
the medication, and Amarin could promote it based “almost entirely on 
statements by the FDA itself”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 156. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167 (2d Cir. 2012) (“While 
some off-label information could certainly be misleading or unhelpful, this case 
does not involve false or misleading promotion. . . . [I]t only furthers the public 
interest to ensure that decisions about the use of prescription drugs, including 
off-label usage, are intelligent and well-informed.” (citations omitted)).  
 157. See Elizabeth Graham Minerd, Guest Post—Midnight Madness—The 
FDA Continues to Discount First Amendment Implications of Restrictions on 
Off-Label Promotion, JD SUPRA (Jan. 27, 2017), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/guest-post-midnight-madness-the-fda-60305/ 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (suggesting that cases like Caronia have not deterred 
the FDA from prosecuting even truthful off-label promotion) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 158. See Ryan Basen, FDA Mulls New Policy on Off-Label Promotion, 
MEDPAGETODAY (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealth 
policy/fdageneral/61323 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (discussing a public hearing 
hosted by the FDA to hear comments on whether and how the agency should 
regulate off-label promotion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Liz Minerd, Guest Post – The FDA’s Two-Day Meeting on Manufacturer Off-Label 
Communications, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.drugand 
devicelawblog.com/2016/11/guest-post-the-fdas-two-day-meeting-on-
manufacturer-off-label-communications.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) 
(summarizing comments made for and against increased regulations during the 
FDA’s two-day meeting on November 9–10, 2016) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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following January, the FDA released a memorandum that seemed 
to double down on the agency’s current approach of prohibiting 
off-label promotion, rather than relaxing its regulations.159 After 
dismissing alternatives to regulation,160 the memorandum merely 
restated the FDA’s current approach,161 while leaving open the 
possibility that the regulations may change under the Trump 
administration.162 
B. POM Wonderful’s Application to Drug-Related Claims 
When the Supreme Court found that the Lanham Act and 
FDCA complemented each other in POM Wonderful, it essentially 
dismissed any future arguments that the FDCA precludes Lanham 
Act claims.163 As a result, if the Court intended FDA preapproval 
to bar Section 43(a) claims, it must have envisioned a different 
conflict necessitating such a bar.164 Yet, courts attempting to 
                                                                                                     
 159. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 130, at 21 (maintaining the 
agency’s argument that “the government’s reliance on speech as evidence of 
intended use under the FD&C Act does not infringe the right of free speech under 
the First Amendment”); see also Minerd, supra note 157 (“[T]he Agency concludes 
that the restrictions on off-label promotion advance substantial government 
interests . . . and are therefore constitutional . . . . The Agency dismisses the 
Second Circuit’s contrary analysis of the off-label promotion restrictions . . . in 
United States v. Caronia . . . .”). 
 160. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 130, at 26 (“Although many of 
these proposed approaches address one or more of the interests identified above, 
FDA is concerned that none of them appear to integrate the complex mix of 
numerous, and sometimes competing, interests at play and thus do not best 
advance those multiple interests.”). 
 161. See id. at 22 (arguing that the FDA does not prohibit off-label speech, but 
merely uses speech as evidence to establish an element of the agency’s prohibition 
on misbranding). But see Nathan Brown, FDA Offers Some Clarity (But Few 
Concessions) on Off-Label Communication of Medical Products, JD SUPRA (Jan. 
30, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fda-offers-some-clarity-but-few-
12036/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“With its pair of draft guidance documents, 
FDA slightly broadens the scope of permissible communications related to 
approved or cleared medical products . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 162. See Minerd, supra note 157 (noting that the comment period for changes 
in FDA regulations closes April 2017).  
 163. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2240 (2014) 
(stating that the statutes’ separate scopes and purposes allow courts to implement 
them at the same time). 
 164. See, e.g., id. at 2241 (leaving available the possibility of preclusion when 
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reconcile the Supreme Court’s narrow holding in POM Wonderful 
with precedent that recognizes broad deference to the FDA have 
demonstrated little disagreement over how POM Wonderful 
applies to Lanham Act claims involving drugs.165 Rather, a 
consensus seems to have formed among courts that deference to 
the FDA’s strict drug regulation might create a preclusive effect in 
limited circumstances.166 Ultimately, this has led to some conflict 
about when, but not whether, drug regulation under the FDCA 
bars Section 43(a) claims.167  
Judicial deference to the FDA in this area of regulation is vital 
to the agency’s continued success, as a lack of consistent deference 
may dilute the agency’s authority in the eyes of those regulated by 
the FDA.168 In the context of drugs and medical devices, which 
have a large impact on public health and safety, an agency’s 
inability to regulate effectively could lead to disastrous results. 
Considering the onus placed on manufacturers to keep their 
labeling accurate as new efficacy data becomes available,169 the 
FDA must command respect from pharmaceutical companies.170 
                                                                                                     
a lawsuit would undermine an agency judgment or policy (citing Geier v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000))); see also JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, 
Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 999 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (contending that the Supreme Court 
intended preclusion in cases where an agency provided multiple options for 
manufacturers to reach compliance with regulations or where a Lanham Act 
claim would conflict with an affirmative FDA policy judgment like preapproval). 
 165. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 64 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (“[R]epresentations commensurate with information in an FDA label 
generally cannot form the basis for Lanham Act liability.”). 
 166. See id. at 64 n.10 (“Lanham Act liability might arise if an advertisement 
uses information contained in an FDA-approved label that does not correspond 
substantially to the label, or otherwise renders the advertisement literally or 
implicitly false.”). 
 167. Compare Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, 
GmbH, 843 F.3d 48, 73 n.13 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing only limited 
circumstances in which FDA action precludes Lanham Act claims), with JHP 
Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (suggesting that claims involving drug labeling 
may be broadly precluded). 
 168. See O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 942 (arguing that a lack of judicial 
deference to agencies leads regulated entities to “deem the agency less potent”). 
 169. See supra Part II.B (discussing the FDA’s ability to withdraw approval 
of drugs and medical devices based on noncompliance with agency regulations).  
 170. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2016) (outlining the FDA’s reapproval of drugs 
and medical devices after manufacturers make label changes to update safety 
information). 
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Importantly, this is not to say that the FDA may override 
congressional acts through its powers of rulemaking and 
enforcement.171 Rather, it is a recognition that courts intended to 
yield to the FDA’s broad authority in the area of drug and medical 
device approval, and that decisions requiring interpretation of the 
FDA’s regulations are best left to the agency’s expertise.172 As the 
Supreme Court established in POM Wonderful, the FDA’s 
regulation of food and beverage labels set a base level of 
requirements for manufacturers.173 But, when the FDA takes an 
active role in preapproving a label, rather than passively listing 
required information that manufacturers may satisfy with a wide 
array of vignettes, the agency creates a greater possibility of direct 
conflict with the Lanham Act.174 In those cases, courts should give 
greater weight to the agency’s expertise and enforcement power.175  
Thus, considering that the Court broadly declined to find a 
statutory conflict, yet alluded to the possibility that more stringent 
FDA procedures may bar Lanham Act claims, the logical 
conclusion is the existence of some sort of preclusion based on 
deference to agency expertise.176 Although the Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                     
 171. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2241 (2014) 
(“An agency may not reorder federal statutory rights without congressional 
authorization.”). 
 172. See O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 942 (“A historic strength of the FDA has 
been the deference received from courts during enforcement actions; indeed, the 
FDA has long nurtured its aura of expertise in order to win the accommodating 
acceptance of judges.”). 
 173. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2240 (noting that Congress did not 
intend the FDCA to act as a ceiling on the regulation of food and beverage labels). 
 174. See JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1000 n.5 (C.D. 
Cal 2014) (identifying the common requirement in the Supreme Court’s 
preclusion analysis as “positive regulatory action” by the FDA).  
 175. See id. at 1003 (suggesting that determining whether a defendant 
misleadingly represents a product as “safe” or “effective” may require resolution 
by the FDA); see also Par Sterile Prods., LLC v. Fresenius Kabi USA LLC, No. 14 
C 3349, 2015 WL 1263041, at *4 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2015) (agreeing with JHP 
Pharm. that some cases involving “complex inquiry” into matters of FDA 
expertise may be precluded); Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Med. Corp., No. 
2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (D. Utah July 17, 2014) (deferring to the 
FDA to resolve whether updates to an FDA-approved label requires reapproval in 
order to avoid misleading consumers). 
 176. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2241 (suggesting that a direct conflict 
with an agency’s policy may warrant preclusion to avoid undermining the 
agency’s judgment).  
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shown considerably high regard for FDA expertise, it is highly 
unlikely that the Court intended to create an outright ban in 
Hynson or Rutherford on any claims involving the agency—
especially considering that the legislature never took such 
action.177 Instead, several post-POM Wonderful cases demonstrate 
a more plausible reason for this deference by attempting to 
reconcile the Supreme Court’s holding with its caveat-in-dictum 
concerning FDA preapproval.178 Similar to POM Wonderful, these 
cases acknowledge that the FDCA does not generally preclude the 
Lanham Act,179 yet they go one step farther to bar claims based on 
pre-POM Wonderful principles of agency deference.180  
For example, a few years before POM Wonderful, federal 
courts agreed that some questions regarding the safety or efficacy 
of medical devices and pharmaceuticals may be better resolved by 
the FDA’s expertise.181 In POM Wonderful, the Supreme Court also 
                                                                                                     
 177. See id. at 2235 (pointing to the lack of legislative action establishing the 
FDCA’s preclusion of the Lanham Act as evidence that the statutes should not 
have such effect); see also supra Part II.B (outlining the holdings of Hynson and 
Rutherford, which helped establish a strong judicial deference to the FDA). 
 178. See supra note 175 (providing examples of post-POM Wonderful cases 
recognizing preclusion or otherwise dismissing claims based on deference to the 
FDA). 
 179. See Par Sterile Prods., 2015 WL 1263041, at *4 (observing that as long 
as the Lanham Act does not require a manufacturer to disobey an FDA 
requirement, Section 43(a) claims will not be precluded); Catheter Connections, 
2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (“[T]he simple fact that a matter touches upon an area 
dealt with by the FDA is not a bar to proceedings with a claim under the Lanham 
Act.” (quoting Pom Wonderful LLC v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 
2d 1112, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2009))). 
 180. See, e.g., Catheter Connections, 2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (relying on 
PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin to dismiss the claim out of deference to the FDA’s 
exclusive enforcement authority). 
 181. See PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(acknowledging the FDA’s primary jurisdiction over FDCA violations); 
Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 512 
(7th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of a claim that would require the court to 
interpret FDA regulations); Alpharma, Inc. v. Pennfield Oil Co., 411 F.3d 934, 
939 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to defer to the FDA, but recognizing that questions 
requiring “expert consideration and uniformity of resolution” may necessitate 
agency intervention (quoting United States v. McDonnell Douglass Corp., 751 
F.2d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1984))); PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 
1113 (2d Cir. 1997) (denying the availability of Section 43(a) as a method to 
enforce the FDCA); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that Mylan could not independently enforce the FDCA through a 
Section 43(a) claim); Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 
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recognized the potential for courts to undermine agency judgment 
by failing to consider adequately the ramifications of overruling 
agency action.182 Citing Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,183 the 
Court explained that courts may bar an action if the ensuing 
litigation would conflict with an agency’s affirmative policy 
choice.184 Thus, while the Court’s holding broadly rejected 
Coca-Cola’s theory of complete statutory preclusion, the Court 
likely did not intend to prevent an FDA policy decision from 
barring certain Lanham Act claims.185 Instead, the Court created 
a presumption against preclusion that defendants in drug-related 
Lanham Act actions may rebut by demonstrating that proper 
resolution requires deference to FDA expertise.186 Since POM 
Wonderful, courts have attempted to define exactly when FDA 
actions should preclude Section 43(a) claims.187 In the next Part, 
this Note analyzes the established methods of preclusion and 
applies them to Section 43(a) claims involving promotion of 
off-label drug uses in order to determine whether existing case law 
would allow competitors to police off-label promotion through the 
Lanham Act.188 
                                                                                                     
222, 231 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[The cited cases] provide no support for the theory that 
it is appropriate for a court in a Lanham Act case to determine preemptively how 
a federal administrative agency will interpret and enforce its own regulations.”). 
 182. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2241 (2014) 
(addressing the government’s claim that the FDA intended to provide flexibility 
in labeling for food and drinks). 
 183. 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 184. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2241 (stating that the court barred the 
action in Geier because it “directly conflicted with the agency’s policy choice”).  
 185. See id. (suggesting that Geier’s holding may preclude future Lanham Act 
claims that would require a court to undermine FDA judgments). 
 186. See JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1000 (C.D. 
Cal 2014) (reasoning that the Court created a presumption against preclusion and 
suggesting two ways of rebutting this presumption). 
 187. Compare infra note 190 (providing examples of situations in which courts 
have allowed claims to continue), with supra note 181 (listing the reasons courts 
have provided for precluding Lanham Act claims). 
 188. See infra Part IV (testing the ability of Section 43(a) claims involving off-
label promotion to survive the direct-conflict and usurpation approaches to 
preclusion). 
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IV. FDA Regulations Preclude Lanham Act Claims Challenging 
Off-Label Promotion 
Some courts have suggested that Lanham Act claims 
challenging drug labels fall under a broad exception to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in POM Wonderful, precluding them 
altogether.189 For the most part, however, courts have allowed 
Section 43(a) claims involving drugs so long as the resolution of 
relevant issues does not require FDA expertise.190 Because the 
FDA has assumed such a large role in prohibiting the promotion of 
off-label drug uses, courts must now determine whether the FDA’s 
involvement bars competitors’ claims of false or misleading 
off-label advertising under Section 43(a).191 
While courts have uniformly held that FDA drug regulation 
may preclude Lanham Act claims after POM Wonderful, each court 
tends to cite different reasons for such preclusion.192 In application, 
however, several trends have emerged, suggesting that any 
difference in language merely reflects the absence of a guiding 
                                                                                                     
 189. See, e.g., JHP Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (suggesting that because 
“the area of drug labeling was specifically singled out by the POM Wonderful 
Court as being one where the FDA takes a particularly active role . . . drug 
labeling might be an area where Lanham Act claims are precluded”). 
 190. See Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, 
843 F.3d 48, 73 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming the denial of defendant’s motion to 
dismiss because the issue was whether advertising could be misunderstood, and 
did not require FDA expertise to resolve); PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 
919, 924–25 (9th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that FDCA questions simple enough for 
courts to resolve would not preclude private Lanham Act claims); see also JHP 
Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d. at 1001 (“In this instance, it takes no special expertise to 
determine whether the FDA has granted approval or not . . . .”). 
 191. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 443 F. Supp. 2d 
453, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (acknowledging the lack of a private right to enforce 
off-label drugs under the FDCA, but allowing a Lanham Act claim to challenge 
whether defendant’s advertising misleads consumers to believe the drug is safe 
and effective for unapproved uses). 
 192. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 64 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (barring Lanham Act claims challenging statements consistent with 
FDA-approved labeling); JHP Pharm., F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (suggesting that 
primary jurisdiction, affirmative policy decision, conflict with an 
FDA-preapproved labeling scheme, and potentially drug labels in general may 
require preclusion); Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Med. Corp., No. 2:14-CV-
70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (D. Utah July 17, 2014) (leaving enforcement of 
the FDCA to the FDA). 
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authority on the issue.193 Two of these trends—barring direct 
conflicts and usurpations of FDA authority—have received 
particularly wide acceptance among courts applying POM 
Wonderful in the context of drugs or medical devices.194  
This Note first seeks to determine whether the current 
approaches to FDA preclusion of Lanham Act claims effectively bar 
competitors’ actions under Section 43(a).195 This inquiry alone 
cannot provide a dispositive answer to the issue, however, as POM 
Wonderful’s application to drug claims remains uncertain.196 Thus, 
the Author also offers a general argument in favor of allowing 
competitors to sue for unfair competition on the basis of off-label 
promotion.197 
A. Direct Conflict with FDA Policy Decisions 
Though the Supreme Court declined to adopt a steadfast rule 
for statutory preclusion in POM Wonderful, it suggested that a 
                                                                                                     
 193. See JHP Pharm., 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 n.5 (speculating as to what 
portions of the Supreme Court’s dicta in POM Wonderful might clarify the Court’s 
intention to preclude Section 43(a) claims involving drug labels and promotion). 
The apparent confusion between the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and courts’ 
deference to the interpretation and enforcement powers of the FDA exemplifies 
this difference in language. Compare id. at 1001 (discussing whether the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine should require dismissal of such Lanham Act claims), with 
Catheter Connections, 2014 WL 3536573, at *6 (precluding a claim based on 
deference to the FDA’s sole enforcement authority). This Note will not attempt 
the feat of expounding upon the differences between primary jurisdiction and 
deference to the interpretation or enforcement powers of the FDA. See RICHARD 
HENRY SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 753 
(Michael Hunter Schwartz ed., 2013) (“Because primary jurisdiction is a rather 
rare bird, some familiarity with the doctrine is the mark of a well-educated 
administrative lawyer.”). 
 194. See JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1000 n.5 (C.D. 
Cal 2014) (suggesting that a conflict with an agency’s policy decision, as in Geier, 
would preclude a Lanham Act claim); Catheter Connections, 2014 WL 3536573, at 
*6 (holding that the plaintiff’s first claim was precluded because it impermissibly 
sought to enforce the FDCA).  
 195. See infra Parts IV.A–B (applying both methods of preclusion to Lanham 
Act claims challenging the promotion of off-label drug uses). 
 196. See supra Part III.B (addressing a conflict between courts, which have 
acknowledged various levels of preclusive effect, and scholars, who suggest a 
broad application of POM Wonderful’s holding). 
 197. See infra Part V (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in POM 
Wonderful should apply to off-label promotion). 
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direct conflict between the FDCA and the Lanham Act would 
create a preclusive effect.198 Similarly, the Court alluded to the 
possibility that a direct conflict with an agency’s policy judgment 
may also preclude actions under Section 43(a).199 Because the 
Court has established that the FDCA and Lanham Act 
complement each other, the former should not become an issue 
unless Congress amends either act.200  
As for when the Lanham Act conflicts with an FDA policy 
judgment, however, the Court provides only superficial 
guidance.201 In POM Wonderful, the Court uses the term “policy 
judgment” merely to distinguish its precedent in Geier.202 After 
suffering an injury in a car accident, the plaintiff in Geier sued 
Honda for not installing an airbag in her 1987 automobile.203 The 
Department of Transportation had promulgated a rule allowing 
manufacturers to choose from a set of active and passive safety 
measures that would meet the agency’s standards.204 Coca-Cola 
argued that its pomegranate-blueberry juice similarly met 
FDA-required safety and ingredient labeling standards.205 The 
Court distinguished the two cases, however, by asserting that the 
Department of Transportation made an affirmative decision to 
                                                                                                     
 198. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2237 (2014) 
(observing that neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA “forbids or limits Lanham 
Act claims challenging labels that are regulated by the FDCA”); see also 
MCCARTHY, supra note 65, § 27:65.50 (“Only if there is a direct conflict between a 
clear mandate of FDCA regulation’s [sic] and Lanham Act enforcement would 
there be a conflict.”). 
 199. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2241 (suggesting that a court could 
bar a claim if the cause of action directly conflicts with an agency’s policy 
judgment). 
 200. See id. at 2240 (“[N]either the statutory structure nor the empirical 
evidence of which the Court is aware indicates there will be any difficulty in fully 
enforcing each statute . . . .”). 
 201. See id. at 2241 (providing only a bare assertion that this case does not 
undermine an agency judgment). 
 202. See id. (pointing to a lack of any affirmative policy choice by the FDA). 
 203. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000) (bringing 
suit under a state tort law). 
 204. See id. at 875 (outlining the intended progression of the Department of 
Transportation’s Standard 208, which listed the available safety devices). 
 205. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2236 (addressing the district court’s 
reasoning that the FDA “has not prohibited any, and indeed expressly has 
permitted some, aspects of Coca-Cola’s label”). 
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allow each of the safety measures, whereas the FDA merely set a 
floor for the information required.206  
Another more relevant example of a conflicting policy 
judgment occurred before POM Wonderful in Schering-Plough 
Healthcare Products v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc.207 Schering-Plough 
Healthcare Products (Schering), which manufactured the 
over-the-counter laxative “MiraLAX,” brought a Lanham Act suit 
seeking to have the defendant manufacturers of similar generic 
drugs remove the symbol “Rx only” from their products’ labels.208 
Schering claimed that the symbol misled consumers who may 
believe that all laxatives using the active ingredient polyethylene 
glycol 3350 required a prescription.209 The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of Schering’s claim because of a conflict 
between Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and FDA regulations.210 
Per FDA requirements, generic medications requiring 
prescriptions must have the symbol “Rx only,” which would 
prevent the court from granting Schering’s request to have it 
removed.211  
FDA preapproval alone should not suffice to disqualify a claim 
under the Lanham Act, however, as the FDA allows manufacturers 
to make minor or moderate changes to a product’s label after 
approval so long as they subsequently notify the agency.212 While 
the regulations permit only “editorial” label changes or changes 
that strengthen consumer knowledge about a product—such as the 
addition of warnings or removal of misleading information—POM 
                                                                                                     
 206. See id. at 2241 (explaining that the Department of Transportation 
“deliberately” provided a choice to manufactures, rather than merely enacting a 
flexible regulation). 
 207. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 
500, 503 (7th Cir. 2009) (involving a medication that was simultaneously 
challenged in an FDA enforcement proceeding). 
 208. See id. at 502–03 (noting that all of the medications involved had the 
same active ingredient of polyethylene glycol 3350 as well as the same dosage, 
strength, and route of administration). 
 209. See id. at 503 (detailing Schering’s argument that the defendants’ labels 
falsely claimed that polyethylene glycol was available by prescription only). 
 210. See id. at 510 (affirming dismissal without prejudice so that Schering 
could refile depending on the results of the open FDA enforcement proceeding). 
 211. See id. (explaining that removing the symbol would constitute a “major” 
change under FDA regulations, requiring further FDA approval). 
 212. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2016) (describing the notification requirements 
for minor, moderate, and major drug label changes). 
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Wonderful shows that a change as slight as font size may mislead 
consumers.213 Additionally, as the Seventh Circuit explained in 
Schering, “it might take years for the agency to get around to 
prohibiting a misleading label.”214 Because an intervening change 
to the label of an FDA-preapproved drug or medical device might 
allow an unapproved label to enter the market, preapproval of a 
product is likely necessary but not sufficient to establish a 
preclusive effect.215 Furthermore, because promotion of off-label 
uses exclusively involves benefits unapproved by the FDA, courts 
should be unable to identify any conflicting policy decision.216  
Proponents of preclusion would likely argue that the FDA’s 
acknowledgement and acceptance of off-label prescribing evidence 
an affirmative policy decision to allow such uses.217 Although the 
allowance of Section 43(a) claims would certainly deter off-label 
promotion, no direct conflict would exist unless the FDA adopted a 
policy requiring off-label use of medications.218 Moreover, the 
agency’s own criminal prohibition on the advertising of these 
potential benefits opposes this theory.219 At best, the FDA has 
                                                                                                     
 213. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2014) 
(focusing on the misleading nature of the font and vignette on Coca-Cola’s 
pomegranate-blueberry juice). 
 214. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., 586 F.3d at 510. 
 215. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2240–41 (rejecting the government’s 
argument that the FDA specifically requiring or authorizing aspects of a label 
precludes a Lanham Act challenge to that label). 
 216. See JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1005 (C.D. 
Cal. 2014) (considering that the lack of FDA approval might effectively remove a 
product from the preclusion argument altogether). 
 217. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he 
FDA generally does not regulate how physicians use approved drugs.”); U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., FDA Drug Bulletin, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 1, 5 (1982) (“Once a 
product has been approved for marketing, a physician may prescribe it for uses 
or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not included in approved 
labeling.”); see also “Off-Label” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices – Information Sheet, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm (last 
updated Jan. 25, 2016) (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (listing six conditions that 
manufacturers must meet in order to begin clinical testing of an off-label use 
without an Investigational New Drug Application) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 218. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2240 (suggesting that a conflict would 
arise “only if the Lanham Act and the FDCA cannot be implemented in full at the 
same time”). 
 219. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 155 (noting that the FDA has equated off-label 
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mired its policy in contradiction by asserting the competing goals 
of providing necessary medical treatment and limiting off-label 
promotion.220 Thus, allowing competitors to bring Lanham Act 
suits challenging the off-label promotion of drugs will create a 
vehicle complementary to, not in conflict with, the FDA’s 
affirmative policy choice to prohibit this advertising.  
B. Usurpation of FDA Authority 
Because the FDCA lacks a private cause of action, competitors 
often seek to enforce FDCA provisions through Section 43(a) suits 
or bring claims that require interpretation of the FDCA or FDA 
regulations.221 Courts have agreed, however, that “a private action 
brought under the Lanham Act may not be pursued when . . . the 
claim would require litigation of the alleged underlying FDCA 
violation in a circumstance where the FDA has not itself concluded 
that there was such a violation.”222 Additionally, “claims that 
require direct interpretation and application of the FDCA are not 
properly recognized because such matters are appropriately 
addressed by the FDA, especially in light of Congress’s intention 
to repose in that body the task of enforcing the FDCA.”223 
Consequently, before the Supreme Court decided POM Wonderful, 
courts typically disallowed Section 43(a) suits in which plaintiffs 
sought indirectly to enforce the FDCA or where courts would have 
to apply or interpret the FDCA—functions reserved to the FDA.224  
                                                                                                     
marketing with misbranding, which is illegal under the FDCA). 
 220. See id. at 166 (“[T]he government asserts an interest in preserving the 
effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process, and an interest 
in reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.”). 
 221. See Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Stratus Pharm., 273 F. Supp. 2d 769, 786 (W.D. 
Tex. 2001) (“[C]ourts have held not only that a plaintiff may not seek to enforce 
directly the FDCA through the Lanham Act but also that a plaintiff may not 
maintain a Lanham Act claim if the claim requires direct application or 
interpretation of the FDCA or FDA regulations.”).  
 222. PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 223. Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int’l, Inc., 191 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Nephro-Tech, Inc., No. 96-2459-JWL, 1997 WL 
94237, at *6 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 1997)). 
 224. See, e.g., PhotoMedex, 601 F.3d at 924 (finding that plaintiff could not 
privately enforce the FDCA); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1139 (4th 
Cir. 1993) (same). Although interpreting and enforcing are arguably different 
630 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 593 (2018) 
Since POM Wonderful, courts have continued to recognize that 
attempts to enforce the FDCA through Lanham Act claims might 
be precluded.225 Typically, defendants must show that the court 
would have to engage not only in fact finding, but also 
interpretation or application of the FDCA.226 For example, in 
PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin,227 PhotoMedex, Inc. filed suit against Ra 
Medical Systems, Inc. (RMS) for claiming that the FDA had 
cleared its excimer laser228 for marketing.229 Rather, RMS had 
received the manufacturing rights for the laser from SurgiLight, 
another developer that had received FDA 510(k) clearance for its 
design.230 Before filing a Lanham Act suit, PhotoMedex, Inc. filed 
a complaint with the FDA reporting RMS for marketing a new 
                                                                                                     
functions, the intertwined nature of the two actions necessitate simultaneous 
consideration. For example, suppose that MedInc markets a medication as “safe 
and effective” without FDA approval under the grandfather clause of the FDCA. 
Pharmaco introduces a new medication that has the same medical indications, 
but that has received preapproval from the FDA. Rather than submitting a citizen 
petition to the FDA, Pharmaco sues MedInc for advertising its drug as “safe and 
effective.” Pharmaco would, in effect, ask the court to enforce the FDCA by 
seeking to invoke the section of the statute that requires the FDA to determine 
the safety and effectiveness of new medications. In order to make such a 
determination, however, the FDA must interpret the FDCA to decide what level 
of safety and effectiveness to require. As such, in order to decide the claim on its 
merits, the court would have to both enforce and interpret the FDCA.  
 225. See, e.g., Innovative Health Sols., Inc. v. DyAnsys, Inc., No. 14-cv-05207-
SI, 2015 WL 2398931, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2015) (recognizing the FDA’s 
sole authority over FDCA enforcement); Par Sterile Prods., LLC v. Fresenius Kabi 
USA LLC, No. 14 C 3349, 2015 WL 1263041, at *4 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2015) 
(noting that POM Wonderful left open the possibility “that a Lanham Act claim 
might be precluded in certain cases that fall within the exclusive purview of the 
FDA”); JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 997–1000 (C.D. 
Cal. 2014) (providing a detailed analysis for future preclusion of Lanham Act 
claims). 
 226. See Innovative Health Sols., 2015 WL 2398931, at *7 (holding that the 
plaintiff’s claim over misuse of an FDA clearance number did not circumvent FDA 
enforcement when the FDA had already spoken on the issue); Par Sterile Prods., 
2015 WL 1263041, at *4 n.5 (noting that litigating the fact of FDA approval does 
not require FDA expertise). 
 227. 601 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 228. See id. at 922, 925 (explaining that excimer lasers are Class II medical 
devices used to treat skin disorders).  
 229. See id. at 923 (“Defendants distributed a brochure which proclaimed that 
Ra Medical’s [laser] was ‘FDA Approved . . . .’”). 
 230. See id. at 922 (noting that SurgiLight gave RMS manufacturing rights 
in exchange for royalties). 
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product without 510(k) clearance.231 Noting that the FDA 
investigated RMS and failed to determine that the new design 
required further clearance, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment for lack of standing.232 The 
court reasoned that “PhotoMedex is not permitted to circumvent 
the FDA’s exclusive enforcement authority by seeking to prove 
that Defendants violated the FDCA, when the FDA did not reach 
that conclusion.”233 Further, the court recognized that “[t]esting 
the truth of PhotoMedex’s claim would . . . require a court to usurp 
the FDA’s prerogative to enforce the FDCA” because it would 
require interpretation of the statute.234 
In Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Medical Corp.,235 the 
District of Utah attempted to provide further clarity and guidance 
for determining when a claim usurps the FDA’s enforcement 
authority.236 There, the court held that the plaintiff improperly 
sought to bring a claim under the FDCA, explaining, “The initial 
decision [that its device was covered by Section 510(k) clearance of 
a similar device] lay in Ivera’s hands. If that decision was wrong, 
the next step lies with the FDA, which may enforce the section and 
require a new submission by Ivera.”237 Conversely, the court 
allowed Catheter Connections’ remaining claims to proceed, 
reasoning that the challenges were fact-based, rather than an 
“interpretation or application of FDA policy or regulatory 
requirements.”238  
Typically, claims that fall into the category of “seeking to 
enforce the FDCA” resemble attempts to circumvent the FDA’s 
enforcement authority.239 As the Ninth Circuit explained in 
                                                                                                     
 231. See id. at 926 (“The issue was presented to the FDA, but it does not 
appear that the agency ever reached the conclusion sought by PhotoMedex.”).  
 232. See id. at 923 (stating that the district court granted summary judgment 
because the FDA has “exclusive jurisdiction over FDCA enforcement”). 
 233. Id. at 928. 
 234. Id. 
 235. No. 2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573 (D. Utah July 17, 2014).  
 236. See id. at *5–7 (distinguishing between interpretation of the FDCA and 
fact finding). 
 237. Id. at *6. 
 238. See id. at *7 (suggesting that requiring the court to inquire into the 
nature of the product, rather than interpret the FDCA, distinguished the 
remaining claims). 
 239. See, e.g., PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010) 
632 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 593 (2018) 
PhotoMedex, the enforcement issue arises when “the claim would 
require litigation of the alleged underlying FDCA violation.”240 
Because the FDA has sought to prohibit nearly all instances of 
off-label promotion, any challenge to such promotion under Section 
43(a) would resemble a private attempt to enforce the FDA’s 
prohibition.241 Thus, it appears that the current preclusion 
jurisprudence might completely bar Lanham Act claims 
challenging off-label promotion, as competitors would inevitably 
usurp the FDA’s enforcement power.242  
V. A Return to POM Wonderful: Allowing Enforcement Through 
Section 43(a) 
Although courts often bar Section 43(a) claims under the 
current preclusion framework, they should create an exception for 
off-label drug promotion. Two considerations support this idea. 
First, the regulation of off-label promotion more closely resembles 
a function of the Lanham Act’s protection against unfair 
competition than the FDCA’s protection of public health and safety 
against adulterated drugs.243 Applying POM Wonderful, then, 
neither the FDCA nor its accompanying FDA regulations should 
bar Section 43(a) claims.244 Second, the FDA has asserted two 
competing governmental interests in its attempts to regulate 
off-label promotion, which courts and the agency alike have had 
                                                                                                     
(noting that the court would not allow PhotoMedex’s claim when the FDA already 
determined there was no violation of the FDCA’s provisions regarding FDA 
clearance). 
 240. Id. 
 241. See supra Part III.B (discussing the FDA’s attempts to prosecute even 
truthful promotion under the FDCA’s misbranding provisions). 
 242. See Minerd, supra note 157 (interpreting the FDA’s latest guidance 
memorandum as merely “set[ing] forth the Agency’s justification for their current 
restrictions on off-label promotion”). 
 243. See Bi, supra note 123, at 999 (recommending the FDA adopt the same 
definition of “false or misleading” as the Lanham Act for evaluating off-label 
speech because the agency’s off-label promotion regulations so closely resemble 
false advertising regulations). 
 244. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014) 
(noting that the Lanham Act, and not the FDCA, focuses on protecting 
commercial interests against unfair competition).  
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difficulty balancing.245 Lanham Act claims, however, rely on 
certain assumptions that will ultimately help balance the FDA’s 
conflicting goals, “tak[ing] advantage of synergies among multiple 
methods of regulation” to support the FDA’s interests in 
maintaining validity of its NDA process and protecting public 
health and safety.246 Thus, returning to the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in POM Wonderful provides an answer for the instant 
regulatory dilemma—the Lanham Act complements the FDCA and 
FDA regulations. Deference to the FDA may occasionally mandate 
the preclusion of Section 43(a) claims, but that preclusion should 
not extend to disputes concerning the promotion of medications for 
off-label uses. 
A. Off-Label Promotion is Unfair Competition 
Viewing off-label promotion through the lens of POM 
Wonderful and its progeny, it appears that a private right of action 
to prevent misleading advertisement falls squarely under the 
scope of Section 43(a) as the regulation of unfair competition.247 
And, while off-label advertising certainly affects public health and 
safety so as also to implicate the FDCA, the Supreme Court in 
POM Wonderful explicitly relied upon the Lanham Act’s distinct 
and complementary purpose to hold that the FDCA did not 
preclude claims under Section 43(a).248 Courts have largely 
distinguished POM Wonderful’s holding when deciding Section 
43(a) claims involving pharmaceuticals based on the FDA’s 
regulation of those products through premarket approval.249 But, 
                                                                                                     
 245. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (weighing 
the FDA’s interests in preserving the NDA process and reducing marketing of 
unsafe products against the FDA’s allowance of off-label use and the ability to 
make informed treatment decisions). 
 246. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2239. 
 247. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The intent of this chapter is to . . . protect 
persons engaged in [interstate] commerce against unfair competition . . . .”); POM 
Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2233–34 (describing the intent and purpose of the 
Lanham Act).  
 248. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238 (“Although both statutes touch 
on . . . labeling, the Lanham Act protects commercial interests against unfair 
competition, while the FDCA protects public health and safety.”). 
 249. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 64 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (“[A]n FDA label generally cannot form the basis for Lanham Act 
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regardless of whether POM Wonderful’s “complementary” holding 
applies to products preapproved by the FDA, off-label promotion 
concerns exclusively unapproved uses of medications.250 Thus, the 
fact that the FDA sought to criminalize off-label promotion under 
the FDCA should not preclude similar civil claims under the 
Lanham Act.251  
As Professor O’Reilly suggests, the FDA holds a unique quality 
as a government agency, departing from the typical approach to 
“agencies as vehicles for populist control of an important aspect of 
the economy.”252 Rather, the agency’s founders sought to provide 
an administration of “passionate consumer advocates who used the 
power of a dispassionate scientific approach to address safety 
issues.”253 In fact, this scientific-expertise-based and 
consumer-oriented approach helped establish the deference to the 
FDA with which courts often treat matters arising under the 
FDCA.254 As a result, public safety depends on the FDA’s NDA 
process, the validity of which the agency has sought to protect 
through its prohibition of off-label promotion.255 But, the agency 
further identifies a contradictory goal, which highlights its 
inability to pinpoint the best regulatory approach to this 
problem.256  
During its litigation of First Amendment challenges, the FDA 
asserted that it indirectly banned off-label promotion for public 
                                                                                                     
liability.”); JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1005 (C.D. Cal. 
2014) (“POM Wonderful suggested, at least obliquely, that drug labeling might be 
an area where Lanham Act claims are precluded.”). 
 250. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152 (defining off-label promotion as being “for 
a purpose not approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration”). 
 251. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2239 (“A holding that the FDCA 
precludes Lanham Act claims . . . would lead to a result that Congress likely did 
not intend.”). 
 252. O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 948. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. at 949 (crediting the FDA’s “reputation for superior science and 
expertise” as the reason for courts’ willingness to give deference to the agency). 
 255. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(recognizing that the government’s “interest in preserving the effectiveness and 
integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process” is substantial). 
 256. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 369–70 (2002) 
(discussing the difficulty of drawing the line between protecting the FDCA’s 
approval process and the continuing need to provide appropriate treatment 
through drug compounding). 
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health and safety, while also conceding the importance of 
maintaining access to drugs for off-label use.257 For that reason, 
the agency has not criminalized the prescribing or use of drugs for 
unapproved uses, but solely their promotion.258 Consequently, the 
FDA’s attempt to criminalize off-label promotion does not so much 
serve the FDCA’s purpose of protecting public health and safety 
from adulterated medications as it does the Lanham Act’s purpose 
of preventing unfair competition. Rather, the pecuniary incentive 
that Section 43(a) creates for competitors would provide a more 
appropriate avenue for preventing the unfair advertising.259 
Although Professors O’Reilly and Van Tassel correctly contend 
that the FDA will provide necessary control over pharmaceutical 
companies’ greed,260 that same greed provides competing 
manufacturers with a compelling incentive to regulate off-label 
promotion.261 Indeed, while the FDA permits citizens to petition for 
                                                                                                     
 257. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 153 (“Off-label use is an ‘accepted and necessary 
corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area without directly interfering 
with the practice of medicine.’” (quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 
531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001))). 
 258. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 217, at 5 (allowing off-label 
prescribing of unapproved drug uses); see also 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) (“Nothing 
in this Act shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health 
care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a 
patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care 
practitioner-patient relationship.”). 
 259. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238–39 
(2014) (“By ‘serv[ing] a distinct compensatory function that may motivate injured 
persons to come forward,’ Lanham Act suits, to the extent they touch on the same 
subject matter as the FDCA, ‘provide incentives’ for manufacturers to behave 
well.” (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555, U.S. 555, 579 (2009))). The FDCA also allows 
the FDA to fine manufacturers for criminal violations of the statute’s 
misbranding provisions, but these punishments still lack the monetary reward 
that entices competing manufacturers to help police off-label promotion. See 21 
U.S.C. § 333 (punishing criminal violations of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions 
with potential fines of up to $1 million after the second offense in ten years).  
 260. See O’REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 31, § 3:2 (“Whether regulatory 
enforcement can control greed is an issue debated to this day in the food and drug 
regulation field. Good faith on the part of the manufacturers is a necessary ideal 
but until that perfect world can be achieved, a strong [FDA] is justified.”). 
 261. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238 
The FDA, however, does not have the same perspective or expertise in 
assessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors possess. 
Competitors who manufacture or distribute products have detailed 
knowledge regarding how consumers rely upon certain sales and 
marketing strategies. Their awareness of unfair competition practices 
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enforcement, it lacks the pecuniary interest that Section 43(a) 
provides to competitors who might have better knowledge about 
competing drugs.262  
Additionally, POM Wonderful suggested that barring Lanham 
Act claims might require the FDA to spread its resources too thin, 
preventing the agency from fully enforcing its regulations.263 
Admittedly, POM Wonderful concerned food and beverage 
regulations, which, as the Supreme Court acknowledged, receive 
much less attention than drug regulations.264 Nonetheless, the 
Court counseled against preclusion, in part because competitors 
have greater resources to challenge misleading advertising.265 
Potential fluctuations in FDA resources and enforcement following 
changes in the executive branch also warrant a backstop in the 
form of Lanham Act liability.266 For example, at the time this Note 
was written, President Trump’s leading candidate to head the FDA 
supported a drastic decline in the NDA process and other 
safeguards that could result in unsafe drugs reaching the 
market.267 As the Supreme Court stated in POM Wonderful, “[t]his 
                                                                                                     
may be far more immediate and accurate than that of agency 
rulemakers and regulators. Lanham Act suits draw upon this market 
expertise by empowering private parties to sue competitors to protect 
their interests on a case-by-case basis. 
 262. See id. at 2238–39 (noting that the Lanham Act provides incentives for 
competing manufacturers to help regulate market practices otherwise regulated 
by the FDCA). 
 263. See id. at 2239 (implying that the FDA lacks the resources to pursue 
enforcement regarding all objectionable labels). 
 264. See id. (recognizing that the FDA does not preapprove food and beverage 
labels like it does drug labels). 
 265. See id. at 2238 (“The FDA, however, does not have the same perspective 
or expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors possess.”). 
 266. See O’Reilly, supra note 41, at 959–62, 977 (observing that the executive 
branch has enormous discretion over the NDA process, and arguing that a 
renewed FDA independence would help the agency regain deference); see also 
John D. Loike & Jennifer Miller, Opinion: Improving FDA Evaluation Without 
Jeopardizing Safety and Efficacy, SCIENTIST (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/48280/title/Opinion--Improving-FDA-
Evaluations-Without-Jeopardizing-Safety-and-Efficacy/ (last visited Feb. 18, 
2018) (considering what changes a new head of the FDA would bring to the 
agency’s NDA process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 267. See Drew Armstrong et al., Trump Team Said to Consider Thiel Associate 
O’Neill for FDA, BLOOMBERG POL. (Dec. 7, 2016, 12:01 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-12-07/trump-team-is-said-to-
consider-thiel-associate-o-neill-for-fda (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“In a 2014 
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is quite consistent with the congressional design to enact two 
different statutes, each with its own mechanisms to enhance the 
protection of competitors and consumers.”268 
B. Section 43(a) Claims Will Protect the FDA’s Stated Interests 
Since its inception in the 1930s, the FDA has faced the difficult 
task of pursuing the FDCA’s goal of protecting public health and 
safety from adulterated drugs.269 Successful administration of its 
own strict standards for new drugs and clinical testing, however, 
has led to a new dilemma. Protecting public safety requires the 
continuation of the NDA process that has ensured safe and 
effective treatment and increased monitoring of dangerous 
medications.270 But, public health may require treatment options 
that lack FDA approval—possibly because a drug lacked 
insufficient supporting data from clinical trials for a particular use 
at the NDA stage, or because the FDA determined that the 
potential side effects outweighed the benefits and declined to grant 
approval.271 In either case, the requirements of Section 43(a) will 
incidentally lead to an appropriate balancing of the FDA’s end 
goals.  
                                                                                                     
speech, he said he supported reforming FDA approval rules so that drugs could 
hit the market after they’ve been proven safe, but without any proof that they 
worked, something he called ‘progressive approval.’”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Loike & Miller, supra note 266 (“O’Neill has publicly 
proposed eliminating the FDA’s requirement for Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials, in an 
effort to lower drug development costs.”). 
 268. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2239 (2014). 
 269. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 
1040 (1938) (providing that the act’s purpose is to protect the public from 
misbranding). 
 270. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(recognizing that the FDA’s interest in preserving its NDA process is 
“substantial”). 
 271. See id. at 153 (“[O]ff-label uses or treatment regimens may be important 
and may even constitute a medically[-]recognized standard of care.” (alterations 
in original) (quoting U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE, GOOD REPRINT 
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR 
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED 
DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 3 (2009))). 
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1. Maintaining Validity of the NDA Process 
Section 43(a), by dissuading competitors from placing a drug 
on the market for an unapproved and unintended use, exemplifies 
the complementary nature of the Lanham Act and FDCA praised 
by the Supreme Court in POM Wonderful.272 Under this scheme, 
manufacturers must choose either to promote a newly discovered 
off-label use—and face the threat of paying monetary damages to 
their competitors—or to put that money toward a supplemental 
application for FDA approval.273 Moreover, if manufacturers face 
both civil liability to their competitors and criminal liability 
through the FDA, the cost of any misleading promotion 
increases.274  
Granted, the reported estimates of bringing a new drug to the 
market might seem exorbitant, but pharmaceutical companies 
often include the cost of research in these estimates.275 
Significantly, the truthful marketing of drugs for off-label purposes 
presupposes the existence of efficacy data for the medications.276 
                                                                                                     
 272. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238–39 (finding the Lanham Act and 
FDCA to be complementary because they serve different functions with 
overlapping subject matter). 
 273. Compare J. SHAWN MCGRATH & KATHLEEN M. KEDROWSKI, DAMAGES 
TRENDS IN PATENT AND LANHAM ACT CASES 9, http://apps. 
americanbar.org/litigation/committees/corporate/docs/2010-cle-materials/05-hot-
topics-ip-remedies-injunctions/05b-damages-trends-ga-bar.pdf (showing that the 
average award for false advertising cases from 2004 and 2008 was between $2.5–
3 million, with the largest damages award being over $16 million), with Standard 
Costs (in Thousands of Dollars) for Components of the Process for the Review of 
Human Drug Applications, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm0934
84.htm (last updated Oct. 2, 2017) (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (listing the average 
cost of new drug application with clinical data at about $1.8 million, and the cost 
of a supplement with clinical data at about $473,000 in 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 274. See 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2012) (punishing manufacturers who violate the 
FDCA’s misbranding provisions with fines from fifty thousand to one million 
dollars). 
 275. See A. Gordon Smith, Price Gouging and the Dangerous New Breed of 
Pharma Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 6, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/price-
gouging-and-the-dangerous-new-breed-of-pharma-companies (last visited Feb. 
18, 2018) (estimating the price of research and development to be anywhere from 
millions of dollars to over $2.6 billion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 276. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)(1) (noting that clinical data is not false or 
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Thus, regardless of whether manufacturers market an approved or 
off-label use, the vast majority of effective marketing will require 
testing and efficacy data.277 The availability of Section 43(a) will 
not limit a pharmaceutical company’s ability to gather real-world 
clinical data, however, as long as the company clearly disclaims 
the insufficiency of supporting efficacy and safety information as 
part of the advertising.278 After Amarin, companies may disclaim 
a drug’s risks and lack of FDA approval to promote truthfully an 
off-label use and avoid Lanham Act liability.279 In effect, this would 
allow companies to promote an off-label use and receive clinical 
data from treatment results instead of paying for additional 
testing. By contrast, then, companies could potentially pay less to 
submit a new use to the FDA than to face civil liability from their 
competitors.280  
Arguably, this could lead to an increase in healthcare costs, 
rather than an increase in NDAs.281 Instead of deterring off-label 
promotion, pharmaceutical companies might continue their 
current practice of merely passing the price of litigation on to 
consumers.282 Any increase in price due to litigation costs of claims 
arising under the Lanham Act, however, presupposes the 
                                                                                                     
misleading if it “is based on competent and reliable scientific evidence”). 
 277. See Hampton, supra note 111, at 683 (stating that physicians prescribing 
off-label uses “have the responsibility to be well-informed about the product, to 
base its use on firm scientific rationale and on sound medical advice”). 
 278. See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (allowing Amarin to promote its medication based on the 
transparency of the advertisements and disclosures). 
 279. See id. (identifying a method by which to avoid liability under Section 
43(a)). 
 280. See supra note 273 (comparing the price of Lanham Act damages to the 
price of FDA approval). 
 281. See Elizabeth Richardson, Health Policy Brief: Off-Label Drug 
Promotion, HEALTHAFFAIRS (June 30, 2016), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20160630.920075/full/ (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2018) (“[P]reventing a manufacturer from communicating about 
an off-label use or the comparative value of its products might . . . increase health 
costs.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 282. See Trisha Marczak, Multimillion-Dollar Settlement for Misleading 
Consumers: Just Another Day at Pfizer, MINTPRESS NEWS (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://www.mintpressnews.com/pfizer-settlement-misleading-
consumers/166292/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“[W]hen it comes to paying for 
costs associated with lawsuits and settlements against drug makers, consumers 
are likely to carry the tab.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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availability of some alternative drug for the same treatment—a 
drug company cannot successfully bring a claim under the Lanham 
Act unless it has suffered losses from a competing product.283 If a 
company hikes the price of their drug to pass litigation costs on to 
its consumers, then those consumers have the option of purchasing 
medications from the competitor, whose product likely received 
approval from the FDA.284 As a result, the availability of Lanham 
Act claims should provide incentives for manufacturers to seek 
FDA approval for their supplemental uses. 
2. Balancing Necessary Treatments with a Potential for 
Dangerous Side Effects 
Both the FDCA and the Lanham Act seek to protect 
consumers—the FDCA from adulterated or misbranded drugs, and 
the Lanham Act from unfair competition.285 Since the FDA began 
interpreting off-label promotion as evidence of misbranding, 
however, the two statutes largely coincide.286 As POM Wonderful 
suggests, despite the difference in legislative intent, the FDCA and 
Lanham Act provide distinct and complementary avenues to 
protect consumers from both unfair competition and adulterated 
or misbranded drugs.287 By focusing on unfair competition, the 
Lanham Act supports the FDCA in the area of off-label promotion 
                                                                                                     
 283. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 
(2014) (requiring that a plaintiff fall within the “zone of interest” by asserting loss 
to either their reputation, or sales as a result of the defendant’s acts). 
 284. See Richardson, supra note 281 (“Rising prescription drug costs have led 
to an increased emphasis on the comparative value of treatments on the 
market . . . which allows individuals to assess the price of a given drug relative to 
its value.”). 
 285. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The intent of this chapter is to . . . protect 
persons engaged in [interstate] commerce against unfair competition . . . .”); 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) 
(“To prohibit the movement in interstate commerce of adulterated and 
misbranded food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, and for other purposes.”). 
 286. See Perez v. Nidek Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1166 (S.D. Cal. 2009) 
(drawing a parallel between plaintiff’s off-label claims and the FDA’s enforcement 
of off-label claims). 
 287. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014) 
(“The two statutes impose ‘different requirements and protections.’” (quoting 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 605 (2001))). 
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where FDA regulation may decrease access to necessary treatment 
options.288 
a. Section 43(a) Does Not Limit Access to Necessary Treatments 
Often patients rely on off-label treatments as options of last 
resort, whether because other treatments have failed, or because 
no medication specifically targets a particular illness.289 For 
example, the story of Lisa Rosendahl shows that off-label uses can 
treat rare or otherwise incurable conditions—an important reason 
not to prevent access to information about off-label options.290 
Where the FDA seeks to limit off-label promotion in all instances, 
however, the Lanham Act likely would not prevent access to 
treatment options in either of these situations. 
In order to prove a prima facie case under Section 43(a), a 
competitor must show losses by demonstrating that sales of its own 
product decreased because of unfair competition.291 Rosendahl’s 
tumor did not respond to traditional treatment options, which her 
doctors exhausted before moving on to the experimental use of 
chloroquine.292 Hypothetically, then, if the manufacturer of the 
chloroquine used to help Rosendahl sought to promote this newly 
discovered use of its drug, the companies selling traditional 
treatments could not establish a prima facie case under the 
Lanham Act. The existing treatments serve a different function 
medically, by targeting glioblastomas directly rather than 
preventing autophagy as chloroquine did.293 Moreover, Rosendahl 
                                                                                                     
 288. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating 
that the FDA’s regulation of off-label promotion “interferes with the ability of 
physicians and patients to receive potentially relevant treatment information”). 
 289. See Hampton, supra note 111, at 683 (reporting that up to 75% of all 
cancer drugs are used for off-label treatments, and 90% of rare diseases are 
treated with off-label medications). 
 290. See Dovey, supra note 7 (noting that Rosendahl’s doctors used 
chloroquine on a “hunch,” and not based on an approved use). 
 291. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 
(2014) (explaining that unfair competition “was understood to be concerned with 
injuries to business reputation and present and future sales”). 
 292. See Dovey, supra note 7 (“[H]er brain tumor proved unresponsive to all 
known treatments.”). 
 293. See id. (indicating that the doctors knew chloroquine could prevent 
autophagy, the process “used by many brain cancers to help them avoid 
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still required traditional medications, as the chloroquine merely 
increased the existing drugs’ effects.294 As a result, the competitor 
would lack the damage and causation required by Section 43(a).295  
Taking a broader look, Lanham Act claims likely cannot 
succeed in challenging the off-label promotion of drugs for 
treatment of rare or otherwise untreatable illnesses. 
Pharmaceutical companies typically focus on profitable 
medications, often choosing to ignore rare conditions in pursuit of 
drugs that will sell more consistently.296 Thus, a doctor prescribing 
an off-label use to a patient who suffers from a rare disease likely 
does so, at least in part, because no other options exist.297 If the 
manufacturer of that drug then seeks to promote the medication’s 
newly discovered use, it will have no competitors to bring suit 
under Section 43(a) because other pharmaceutical companies have 
not sought to develop treatments for such a rare condition.298  
Even if another treatment option exists, the off-label use of 
drugs as last-ditch efforts often follows exhaustion of existing 
treatments, like in the case of Rosendahl.299 In those situations, 
                                                                                                     
treatment”). 
 294. See id. (“[W]ithout its greatest defense, the tumor would be more 
vulnerable to traditional treatments used to destroy it.”). 
 295. See Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1390 (requiring a plaintiff to establish 
proximate cause under Section 43(a)). 
 296. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Innovation and the Orphan Drug Act, 1983–
2009: Regulatory and Clinical Characteristics of Approved Orphan Drugs, in 
RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT 291, 291 (Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F. Boat eds., 2010) (“If a 
disease affects a limited number of patients and does not allow recovery of private 
research investment, then therapeutic products for that condition may be 
developed slowly or not at all.”). But see id. at 292 (explaining that the Orphan 
Drug Act of 1983 sought to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop 
treatments for rare diseases). 
 297. See Robert H. Pritchard, Off-Label Uses of Approved Drugs: A New 
Compromise is Needed, LEDA HARV. L. SCH., https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream 
/handle/1/8965544/rpritcha.html?sequence=2 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (“In 
some situations, an off-label prescription is the only treatment available to a 
patient, . . . because a more targeted drug is [sic] does not exist . . . .”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 298. See Stafford, supra note 111, at 1427 (recognizing that off-label uses may 
be the only treatments available for “orphan” (rare) conditions). 
 299. See Pritchard, supra note 297 (suggesting that an off-label treatment 
might be the only option when “other methods of treatment are ineffective or 
unavailable to patient intolerance”). 
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the off-label treatment most likely applies a different medical 
approach to the problem and, therefore, does not take profits from 
other companies’ products.300 If a doctor decides that an 
experimental or newly discovered off-label treatment may better 
suit their patients than existing treatments, then companies with 
competing products might have standing under Section 43(a).301 
But, that ultimately serves the FDA’s purpose of eliminating 
dangerous off-label treatments, as discussed below. 
b. Section 43(a) Will Help Eliminate Dangerous Off-Label 
Treatments 
The FDA’s NDA process weeds out potentially dangerous 
drugs, while granting approval to those found safe and effective for 
particular treatments.302 Often a denial of approval may result 
from insufficient data or a risky side effect.303 Consequently, the 
agency may approve a drug for only one of a number of potential 
treatments, balancing the potential risks with the benefits for each 
indicated condition.304 This weighing process leads to the approval 
of drugs like many chemotherapeutic agents—necessary for the 
treatment of several cancers, but with potentially painful and fatal 
side effects.305 On the other end of the spectrum, a nighttime cough 
medicine might be approved as a decongestant, while the potential 
                                                                                                     
 300. See Wittich et al., supra note 112, at 982 (noting that doctors might resort 
to “any treatment that is logical and available” to treat life-threatening 
conditions). 
 301. See id. (acknowledging that doctors may prescribe drugs that fall in the 
same class as other common treatments, even if those drugs have not received 
approval for the same indications). 
 302. See Sacks et al., supra note 12, at 379 (claiming that rejection of an NDA 
helps keep ineffective or harmful drugs off the market). 
 303. See id. at 380–82 (listing common reasons for delay or denial of an NDA). 
 304. See Wittich et al., supra note 112, at 982 (discussing how drugs may lack 
evidence of efficacy for a particular class of patients, leading to FDA approval of 
the studied class only). 
 305. See Jeff Roberts, The Most Dangerous & Heavily Promoted Prescription 
Drugs & Their Potential Natural Alternatives, COLLECTIVE EVOLUTION (Oct. 14, 
2014), http://www.collective-evolution.com/2014/10/14/the-most-dangerous-heavily- 
promoted-prescription-drugs-possible-natural-alternatives/ (last visited Feb. 18, 
2018) (stating that chemotherapeutic agents may cause liver and kidney toxicity, 
lung disease, problems with immune systems and bone marrow, and could lead 
to death) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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negative effects of long-term use prevent its approval as a sleep 
aid.306 Nobody would suggest that cough syrup poses more of a 
threat to health than a chemotherapeutic agent, but when weighed 
against the benefits of an extra hour of sleep or the treatment of 
cancer, respectively, the risk of the cough medicine’s side effects 
likely does not outweigh the benefit. 
Here, the Lanham Act’s requirements provide balanced 
regulation of off-label claims by allowing well-established off-label 
use to continue, while providing an avenue to challenge 
unsupported off-label promotion. Competitors might have 
standing under Section 43(a) in cases where drugs lack sufficient 
clinical support for the claims made during advertising, but if 
scientific clinical trials support the efficacy and safety of an 
off-label use then the medical community, not the manufacturer, 
often promotes that use.307 The FDA has even provided guidance 
for when Continuing Medication Education programs are 
sufficiently independent from pharmaceutical companies to allow 
discussion of off-label uses.308  
In cases where the medical community, and not a 
manufacturer, provides “statements of scientific conclusions about 
unsettled matters of scientific debate,”309 the First Amendment 
protects the dissemination of efficacy information, even from 
private actions under the Lanham Act. Presumably, if the medical 
community has endorsed a particular use, then medical 
professionals have witnessed the potential risks and benefits and 
formed their own opinion that the off-label use is sufficiently safe 
and effective.310 Doctors and patients will then continue to receive 
supporting data for well-established, off-label treatment options 
                                                                                                     
 306. See Park et al., supra note 11, at 226 (“In general, [antihistamines] are 
not FDA-approved for the treatment of insomnia, though their use is supported 
by a large body of patient and clinical experience.”). 
 307. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(identifying sources the FDA has allowed to disseminate information about 
off-label uses, like textbooks, medical colleagues, and educational programs). 
 308. See id. at 57 (providing twelve factors to determine whether education 
programs are “independent”). 
 309. ONY Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 310. See id. at 497 (explaining that where an opinion is based on truthful and 
nonmisleading scientific discourse, it is protected). 
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even without promotion by the manufacturer.311 Conversely, if 
competitors can show that a pharmaceutical company has a role in 
promotion, and that the claims have misled consumers, such 
advertising might give rise to liability under the Lanham Act.312 
As such, availability of Section 43(a) to challenge off-label 
promotion should not eliminate necessary or widely beneficial 
off-label drug use and promotion. Rather, it should effectively 
regulate manufacturers’ claims of experimental or secondary uses 
that have yet to receive proper attention in clinical trials. 
VI. Conclusion 
Both the Lanham Act and the FDCA seek to “protect 
consumers,” albeit within different spheres of the law and through 
distinct means. Yet, while Congress and the Supreme Court have 
allowed the statutes to continue working in tandem to support a 
unified goal, lower courts have nonetheless found that questions of 
law requiring FDA expertise often bar Lanham Act claims 
challenging a drug’s label. The problem remains that although the 
FDA deserves deference in regulating drug products, the agency’s 
limited resources prevent it from effectively protecting public 
health from false or misleading off-label promotion on its own.  
Instead, courts should follow POM Wonderful and allow 
competitors to help police off-label promotion with Section 43(a) 
claims. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in POM Wonderful, 
the Lanham Act creates an incentive for competitors to police false 
or misleading marketing and would not conflict with the FDA’s 
goals. Rather, Section 43(a) complements the FDA’s regulations by 
ensuring access to necessary treatment, reducing the prevalence of 
dangerous off-label use, and maintaining the validity of the FDA’s 
NDA process. As such, POM Wonderful stands for the proposition 
that the best approach to eliminating false or misleading off-label 
promotion requires the FDCA to work in conjunction with 
                                                                                                     
 311. See Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (assuring that 
manufacturers still may not distribute certain off-label promotional materials 
even though the medical community may recognize a use). 
 312. See id. (limiting the court’s holding to allow dissemination only through 
“independent program providers”). 
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pharmaceutical companies that use Section 43(a) to challenge 
unfair competition.  
